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PRICE THEORY AND VERTICAL RESTRAINTS:
A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION
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The Chicago School of antitrust analysis has exerted a strong influence over
the law of vertical restraints in the past two decades, leading the Supreme
Court to abandon much of its traditional hostility toward such agreements.
Chicago's success has provoked a vigorous response from Populists, who sup~
port the traditional approach. Chicago, Populists claim, has improperly relied
upon neoclassical price theory to inform the normative and descriptive assump~
tions that drive its analysis of trade restraints generally and of vertical
restraints in particular. This reliance is misplaced, Populists assert, because
the real world departs from that portrayed by price~theoretic models and, at
any rate, the Congress that enacted the Sherman Act did not understand the
price~theoretic concept of allocative efficiency that Chicagoans employ as their
normative benchmark. Instead, Populists assert, Congress meant to ensure
an open competitive process, free of the sort of coercive abridgments of trader
freedom represented by vertical restraints, which manufacturers impose
through an exercise of market power. As a result, Populists conclude that
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the Supreme Court should revert to .its traditional hostility toward such
agreements.
In this Article, Professor Alan Meese demonstrates that the Populist critique of
Chicago's prescriptions regarding vertical restraints is unfounded. As an ini,
tialmatter, Chicago's descriptive approach to such agreements does not depend
upon price theory, but instead upon the New Institutional Economics, which
embraces many real world departures from price theoretic models. Moreover,
even if one adopts the normative premise advanced by the Populists, that is,
that coercive restraints should be condemned regardless of anticompetitive
effect, there is no reason to repudiate recent developments in the law of vertical
restraints. The New Institutional Economics demonstrates that vertical
restraints can attenuate certain market failures that result from manufac,
turer's decision to rely upon dealers to distribute its goods. Contrary to the
Populist assumption, ironically founded on price theory, that such arrange,
ments are foisted on dealers through an exercise of market power, restraints
that do, in fact, mitigate market failure can be the result of a purely voluntary
process of contractual integration. Absent an empirical showing that most
such agreements are not entered into voluntarily, or, in the alternative, a new
definition of coercion, the Populist attempt to rehabilitate the traditional hos,
tility toward vertical restraints must be rejected favor of the sort of" Rule of
Reason" approach advocated by many in the Chicago School.

a

in

Antitrust and economic theory have not always worked well together.
According to nineteenth,century economists, cartels were doomed to fail,
1
ure because high prices would attract new. entry . Efforts to root them out,
2
therefore, were deemed unjustified infringements on liberty. Trusts, and
l. Professor Herbert Hovenkamp has summarized this thinking niCely:
Within the classical paradigm, monopoly prices could never be earned in any industry
unless people were artificially restrained from entering.... A mere agreement among
sellers to fix prices was of little concern, provided that neither the price fixers nor the
state forbade others from entering the field. If the cartel members sought to charge
monopoly prices, new competition would immediately frustrate their attempt.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 282-83 (1991); see also, e.g.,
Theodore W. Dwight, The Legality of the Trusts, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 592,631 (1888) ("'Trusts,' as a
rule, are not dangerous. They cannot overcome the law of demand and supply nor the resistless
power of unlimited competition."); Franklin H. Giddings, The Persistence of Competition, 2 POL.
SCI. Q. 62, 65 ( 1887); George Gunton, The Economic and Social Aspects of Tru.its, 3 POL SCI. Q.
385, 385-408 (1888). This view, of course, was reflected in many common law decisions of the
period, which either enforced price-fixing agreements outright or refused to find them to be illegal conspiracies. See, e.g., Dolph v. Troy Laundry Mach. Co., 28 F. 553 (N.D.N.Y. 1886)
(enforcing a price-fixing agreement); Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. 522 (1880) (enforcing
a market division agreement); Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889),
affd, A. C. 25 ( 1892) (refUsing to find cartel to be an illegal conspiracy).
2. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTOTHENATUREAND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (Modem Library 1937).
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the mergers that created them, were not merely innocuous, but, indeed, a
3
source of efficiencies that contributed to .economic progress. The Sherman Act--designed at a minimum to ban cartel agreements and mergers to
4
monopoly-was a repudiation of the views of the economics profession.
One might have predicted, then, that courts interpreting the Sherman
Act would have followed the lead of the enacting Congress and ignored the
views of economists. Such a prediction, however, would have proven
5
false. For at least half a century, the Supreme Court has, when formulating antitrust doctrine, relied heavily upon economic theory to inform its
view of the origins and effects of trade restraints. Ironically, in light of the
initial indifference of economists toward antitrust regulation, much of this
reliance has come at the behest of those supporting expansive or "Populist"
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment or diversion, but the
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public or in some contrivance to raise
prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which ·either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice.
Id. at 128 (emphasis added); see also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the price regulation of an elevator cartel violates due process); Dolph, 28 F. at 555
("It is quite. legitimate for any trader to obtain the highest price he can for any commodity in
which he deals. It is equally legitimate for two rival manufacturers or traders to agree upon a
·
scale of selling prices for their goods, and a division of their profits.").
3. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 218-19 (summarizing the views of nineteenthcentury economists that "trusts would generally produce lower prices rather than higher ones");
see also DAVID WELLS, RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE PRODUCTION
AND DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND THE WELL BEING OF SOCIETY 73-75 ( 1896 ).
4.
As George Stigler once stated:
A careful student of the history of economics would have searched ·long and hard, on
the unseasonably cool day of July 2, 1890 ~f the day the Sherman Act was signed by
President Harrison, for any economist who had ever recommended the policy of actively
combatting collusion or monopolization in th!! economy at large.
George J. Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, in THE ECONOMIST AS PREACHER
AND 0rHER ESSAYS 38, 41 (1982); accord RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN
AMERICAN POLITICS ZOO (1965) ("The Sh~rman Act was framed and debated in the pre-expert
era, when economists as a professional group were not. directly consulted by the legislators. But
even if they had been, they would have given mixed and uncertain advice."); see also United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (1898), affd, 175 U.S.Zll (1899) (Tafr, J.)
(holding that the Sherman Act was meant to outlaw price-fixing agreements); Robert H. Lande,
Wealth Transfers as the Original ~nd Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982) (demonstrating that Congress meant the Sherman Act
to outlaw cartel agreements and mergers to monopoly).
.
5.
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 268 ("One of the great myths about American amitrust policy is that courts began to adopt an 'economic approach' to antitrust problems only in
the 1970s. At most, this 'revolution' in antitrust policy represented a change in economic models. Antitrust policy has been forged by economic ideology since its inception."); Michael S.
Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics,74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 226
(1995) ("In almost every era of antitrust history, policymakers have employed ~conomic models
to explain or modify the state of the law and the rationale for its enforcement.").
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readings of the act. For instance, the Court treated tying contracts with
hostility because economists argued that they were necessarily imposed by
7
means of market power. Mergers in relatively unconcentrated industries
were once condemned, as the industrial organization theory of the time
8
predicted that such combinations would lead to higher prices. Vertical
integration, whether by contract or merger, was viewed with suspicion
9
because it "foreclosed" independent sellers from the relevant market.
6.
See generaUy Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of AntitTust and the Delusions of Motkls:
The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511 (1984 ). This Article will employ the
term "Populist" to refer to those scholars who assert that, in scrutinizing trade restraints under
the antitrust laws, courts should consider not only the restraint's economic effects, but its social
and political effects as well. See Jacobs, supra note 5, at 220-22, 236 (describing the "Modem
Populist School").
7.
See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949), citing John Miller's
book, Unfair Competition, for the proposition that ties are necessarily "imposed" by means of
market power. See jOHN MILLER, UNFAIR COMPETITION 199 (1941). See also CARL KAYSEN &
DoNALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 157 (1959) ("(T)ying implies some market power on
the part of the seller practicing it."); WILLIAM H. S. STEVENS, UNFAIR COMPETITION 54-55
(1917); WardS. Bowman Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20
(1957) ("To sell or lease one commodity, the tying product, advantageously on condition that it
be used with another commodity, the tied product, requires the existence of monopoly powerin economic theory, the ability to control supply."). This view of the relationship between
market power and the formation of tying contracts was not limited to the economics profession.
See, e.g., William B. Lockhart & Howard R. Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in
Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARV. L. REV.
913, 945-46 (1952); see also Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: FareweU
to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 1997) (describing the
assumption by legal academics that tying contracts are necessarily imposed by an exercise of
market power).
8. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364-65 (1963) (relying,
inter alia, on the work of economists George Stigler, Carl Kaysen, and Donald Turner, for the
proposition that a merger creating a firm with 20% of a relevant market should be presumed illegal); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Derek
Bok and the Merger of Law and Economics, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 515 (1988) (documenting
the Warren Court's use of economic theory to support its merger decisions). Such decisions
relied upon the so-called "structure-conduct-performance" model of industrial organization, a
model that predicted that even moderate levels of concentration inevitably led to tacit collusion,
reduced output, and higher prices. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:
THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE§ 1.7, at 42-44 (1994) (describing the relationship between the structure-conduct-performance paradigm and merger law of the 1950s-1960s).
The Chicagoans, of course, took issue with the structure-conduct-performance approach and,
based on their own scholarship, have declared it dead. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 111 (1976); Frank H. Easterbrook, AUocating AntitTUSt Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J.
305, 308-09 (1987) ("The empirical foundation on which much antitrust policy was built has
been washed away."); Sam Peltzman, The Gains and Losses from Industrial ConcentTation, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 229 (1977).
9.
See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 334 (declaring illegal the merger between a shoe
manufacturer and a shoe retailer due to the fear that the new entity would deny independent
shoemakers access to retailing, thus foreclosing them from the market); Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at
. 314 (finding the contract requiring gasoline stations to purchase fuel exclusively from Standard
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More recently, however, the courts have paid less heed to economic
theories supporting Populist results, and more to other theories, particularly
10
those associated with the so-called "Chicago School" of antitrust analysis.
As a result, the direction of antitrust .law has changed radically over the
past two decades: courts no longer presume that tying contracts are anti12
competitive;" mergers in concentrated industries are sometimes allowed;
13
and vertical integration is viewed more favorably.
Where antitrust
doctrine is concerned, the only dispute is over just how complete the
14
Chicago victory has been.
Nowhere has Chicago's influence been more important than with
respect to vertical distribution restraints, that is, contracts governing the
15
terms under which dealers may resell a manufacturer's product. Populists
Oil unlawful due to the purported foreclosure of independent gasoline suppliers from the
market); KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 7, at 127-34, 159-60; Louis Schwartz, Potential
Impairment of Competition-The Impact of Standard Oil of California v. United States on the
Standards of Legality Under the Clayton Act, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 10 (1949).
10. See, e.g., jacobs, supra note 5, at 226-32 (describing the Chicago School of antitrust
analysis); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)
(relying on Chicago School scholarship for the proposition that predatory-pricing schemes are
rarely tried and even more rarely successful).
II.
See jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (holding that a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the seller has market power over the tying product in order to
invoke the per se rule).
12. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974); United States v.
Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Thomas, j.) (rejecting a challenge to a
merger that created a highly concentrated market because of ease of entry); United States v.
Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984) (same).
13. See jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 710 (7th Cir.
1984) ("Vertical integration is a universal feature of economic life and it would be absurd to
make it a suspect category under the antitrust laws just because it may hurt suppliers of the service that has been brought within the firm."); Fruehauf Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 603 F.2d
345, 351-53 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that significant market foreclosure, without more, does not
render a vertical merger suspect); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, 663 F. Supp.
1360, 1489 (D. Kan. 1987) ("Vertical integration is not an unlawful or even suspect category
under the antitrust laws.").
14. See, e.g., STEPHEN ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 3 (1993) ("The now ascen·
dant view is that antitrust laws should promote allocative economic efficiency."); Eleanor M. Fox
& Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From?
Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 955-56 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court
has not, in fact, embraced the Chicago approach entirely); Peter M. Gerhart, The Supreme Court
and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of the Chicago School, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 319; jacobs,
supra note 5, at 226-27 (describing Chicago's "ascendancy"); see also Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz,
807 F.2d 520, 566-70 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that recent Supreme Court case law reflects exclusive concern with economic efficiency).
15.
See ROSS, supra note 14, at 224 (defining vertical restraints). It should be noted that
the term "vertical restraints" can encompass any number of arrangements between a seller and
customer. This Article will employ the phrase to refer solely to certain vertical distribution
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have always viewed such agreements with hostility, arguing that they
16
unduly interfere with a dealer's independent business judgment. ln particular, Populists have focused their ire on two sorts of vertical restraints:
exclusive territories, that is, agreements granting dealers the sole right to
17
market and sell within a certain geographic area; and resale pri~e maintenance, that is, agreements setting the price at which a dealer may resell
18
the supplier's product. Traditionally, the Supreme Court sided with the
Populists, holding that agreements conferring exclusive territories or grant19
ing the supplier authority over resale prices were illegal per se.
The Chicago School objected strenuously to this stance, arguing that,
unless part of a horizontal conspiracy, vertical restraints should be analyzed
under the Rule of Reason or should be beyond antitrust scrutiny altogether.20 Over the past two decades, the Court, apparently influenced by
this scholarship, has moderated its traditional stance. For instance, in
restraints-agreements between suppliers and dealers governing the terms under which a dealer
may resell the manufacturer's product. More precisely, as used in this Article, the phrase
"vertical restraints" refers to minimum resale price maintenance, maximum resale price maintenance, and exclusive territories.
16. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
17. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, § 11.6, at 426-27 (defining "exclusive territory" as an
arrangement under which "[a) manufacturer might specify the locations of its retail outlets and
not deal with anyone who resells the product somewhere else"); ROSS, supra note 14, at 224
(noting that "exclusive territorial agreements permit the retailer to sell only to customers within
a designated geographic area").
18. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, § 11.1, at 393 (defining "resale price maintenance" as
"manufacturer or supplier regulation of the price at which a product is resold by independent
dealers"); ROSS, supra note 14, at 224 ("[R)esale price maintenance involves agreements between
a manufacturer and its retailers that fix the minimum price at which retailers will sell the manufacturer's product.").
19. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding maximum resale price
maintenance agreements per se unlawful); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365 (1967) (concluding that agreements granting exclusive territories are illegal per se), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 ( 1977); Dr. Miles Med. Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 3 73 ( 1911) (determining that minimum resale price maintenance agreements are per se unlawful).
20. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
227-31 (The Free Press 1993) (1978) (arguing that vertical restraints should be per se legal);
William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL. L. REV. 933, 948-49
(1987) (advocating a Rule of Reason approach to vertical restraints); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Maximum Price
Fixing) (arguing that maximum price fixing, including maximum resale price maintenance,
should be analyzed under the Rule of Reason); Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and
the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Vertical
Arrangements) (advocating a Rule of Reason approach to vertical restraints); Richard A. Posner,
The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L.
REV. 6 ( 1981) (arguing that vertical restraints should be per se legal).
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Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania Inc., 21 the Court abandoned the
per se rule against exclusive territories and held that such restraints should
22
be analyzed under the Rule of Reason. According to most scholars, this
new approach, under which the plaintiff must prove that the restraint is, on
.
. . 23 near ly amounts to a ru le of per se lega l'tty. 24
balance, anucompeuuve,
Moreover, while the Court has not formally abandoned the per se rule
against resale price maintenance, it has narrowed substantially the definition of the offense, holding, for instance, that termination of a dealer
25
because the dealer is charging low prices is not unlawful. Further, the
Court has narrowed substantially the class of plaintiffs who may challenge
maximum resale price maintenance agreements, and lower courts have
21. 433 u.s. 36 (1977).
22. See id.; see also id. at 47 (citing with approval the work of Richard Posner as well as
scholars sympathetic to the Chicago approach); jean Wegman Bums, Vertical Resrrainr:s,
Efficiency, and the Real World, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 610-13 (1993) (arguing that in
Continental T.V., the Supreme Court adopted the Chicago "economic efficiency" approach to
vertical restraints).
23. See Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 49-57 & n.27; see also Crane & Shovel Sales Corp.
v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 1988). See generally Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (describing Rule ofReason analysis).
24. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, § 11.6b, at 431 ("The rule of reason has come
close to creating complete nonliability for vertical nonprice resrraints."); Ross, supra note 14, at
240 ("(V)irtually no plaintiffs have prevailed under Sylvania's rule of reason."); Baxter, supra note
20, at 936; Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Resrrainr:s: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60
ANTITRUST L.j. 67 (1991).
25. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (noting that
termination of a price-cutting dealer is not unlawful absent an agreement between the manufacturer and other dealers on a specific minimum price level); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); see also Maxwell M. Blecher, The Impact of GTE Sylvania on
Antirrust Jurisprudence, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 17, 20 (1991) (stating that under the law as articulated in Sharp and Monsanto, "only the most poorly advised manufacturer will be found liable for
resale price fixing."); Bums, supra note 22, at 611-13 (arguing that the holding of Business
Elecrronics rests upon the Chicago approach); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Sharp Dealing: The
Horizontal/Vertical Dichotomy in Distributor Termination Cases, 38 EMORY L.j. 311, 315 (1989)
("(S]harp actually effected a de facto overruling of the per se approach.").
Indeed, some scholars have read recent decisions as effectively eliminating altogether any
antitrust scrutiny-even under the Rule of Reason-of purely vertical resale price maintenance
agreements. See, e.g., Barbara Ann White, Black and White Thinking in the Gray Areas of
Antirrust: The Dismantling of Vertical Resrrainr:s Regulation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1(1991 ).
The net effect of [the) new standard [announced in Business Elecrronics Corp.] is not so
much to enlarge the scope of rule of reason applications (thougb, to some extent, that
end is achieved), but to eliminate from the continuum altogether a large class of cases
involving vertical price-fixing conduct, including those that almost all scholars would
agree should be subject to antitrust condemnation.
Id. at 35; see also Rudolph j. Peritz, A Genealogy of Vertical Resrrainr:s Doctrine, 40 HASTINGS L.j.
511, 550-51 (1989) ("[The Court's) formalistic analysis ... perhaps has made dealer terminations legal per se.").
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predicted that the Supreme Court will ultimately abandon the per se rule
. sueh contracts. 26
agamst
Chicago's success has led Populists to rethink the role that economic
theory should play in the formulation of antitrust doctrine. This reflection
has led Populists to launch an extended critique of Chicago's reliance upon
economic theory to formulate its antitrust policy prescriptions, as well as
those Supreme Court decisions that have been influenced by the Chicago
27
approach. Populists do not find error in Chicago's reliance on economics
28
as such. Instead, they take issue with Chicago's purported reliance upon a
certain brand of economics-neoclassical price theory-to formulate its
version of antitrust policy.
More precisely, Populists see two basic flaws in the way Chicago has
employed price theory: one descriptive, one normative. As a descriptive
matter, they assail Chicago's (purported) claim that the model of perfect
competition associated with price theory is a useful tool for determining
the origins and effects of trade restraints. The real world, Populists say, is
far more complicated than that portrayed by the Chicago School's model,
with the result that Chicago's descriptive claims are highly dubious. As a
normative matter, they challenge Chicago's assertion that "allocative efficiency" is the sole goal of the antitrust laws. According to the Populists,
Congress simply did not understand the concept of allocative efficiency,
which, in fact, was foreign even to most economists of the day. At any
rate, they contend that the Sherman Act does not direct the courts to
implement one or the other economic theories, but instead evinces a congressional intent to protect a whole host of values-economic, political,
and social-implicated by trade restraints. An approach based solely upon
allocative efficiency, or any other purely economic standard, would, they
claim, improperly substitute theory for policy, and economics for law.
26.
See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990) (holding that
a competitor of dealers who is prevented from raising prices by maximum resale price maintenance does not suffer antitrust injury, and thus cannot maintain a private right of action); Khan
v. State Oil. Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) ("Albrecht was unsound when
decided, and is inconsistent with later decisions by the Supreme Court. It should be overruled.
Someday, we expect, it will be."), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 941 (1997); Newport Components v.
NEC Home Elecs., 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1546 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see also Atlantic Richfield, 495 U.S.
at 343 n.l3 (describing some procompetitive virtues of maximum resale price maintenance and
noting that Albrecht was premised on Schwinn's now-defunct holding that exclusive territories are
per se illegal); Roger Blair & Gordon Lang, Albrecht After ARCO: Maximum Resale Price
Maintenance Moves Toward the Rule of Reason, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1007 (1991).
27. See infra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
28. Cf. Jacobs, supra note 5, at 226 ("The Chicago School is hardly the first to have
developed an economic approach to antitrust.").
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It is the thesis of this Article that the Populists have misapprehended
the relationship between economic theory and law, at least where vertical
restraints are concerned. This misapprehension takes two broad forms.
First, Populists falsely attribute to the Chicago School a reliance upon
neoclassical price theory to inform the descriptive assumptions that drive
its analysis. Chicagoans do sometimes claim to premise their policy pre,
scriptions on descriptions of the real world that are derived from price the,
ory. In reality, however, their descriptive approach to vertical restraints is
grounded on the so,called New Institutional Economics (NIE). Far from
resting on the sort of limiting assumptions that characterize price,theoretic
models, NlE is self,consciously grounded in the "real world," explicitly
embracing and emphasizing many of the departures from perfect competi,
tion highlighted by the Populists. Thus, the demonstration by Populists
that the assumptions animating price,theoretic models do not comport
with the real world in no way undermines Chicago's descriptive approach.
Second, Populists incorrectly assert that their own approach to verti,
cal restraints is divorced from price theory, and that Chicago's approach,
together with the approach currently taken by the Supreme Court, neces,
sarily depends upon an assertion that "allocative efficiency" is the sole goal
of the antitrust laws. Contrary to their assertions, Populist prescriptions
regarding vertical restraints do not flow ineluctably from normative
assumptions unrelated to economic theory.
Instead, Populists have
employed price theory to inform their own normative premises, concluding
that the Sherman Act was designed to preserve a competitive process free
from the influence of coercion, defined as the exercise of market power.
Given this normative premise, which attributes legal significance to market
power-a price,theoretic concept-the Populist assertion that vertical
restraints should be presumed unlawful depends upon a critical descriptive
assumption also associated with price theory, namely, that manufacturers
must employ such power to coerce dealers to "agree" to these contracts.
While the presupposition that vertical restraints are necessarily
"forced" on dealers was, at one time, apparently uncontested within the
legal and economics professions, it is now demonstrably false. Application
of the NIE-an alternative to price theory-requires the conclusion that
such contracts may well be examples of purely voluntary integration, unre,
lated to the exercise of market power. As a result, the Populists' attempt to
challenge the Chicago position, overthrow modem doctrine, and restore
their own approach can only succeed if some new theory--descriptive or
normative-is forthcoming, a theory that justifies the results they seek.
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Furthermore, while it is certainly true that Chicagoans have argued
vigorously for the adoption of allocative efficiency as the exclusive goal of
the antitrust laws, close analysis suggests that one need not embrace this
standard to adopt the position that many Chicagoans hold with respect to
vertical restraints. Indeed, even if one adheres entirely to the normative
framework offered by the Populists, rigorous application of the NlE requires
rejection of the Populist approach in favor of a presumption that such
restraints are legal.
Ironically, then, while Populists attack Chicagoans for relying upon
price theory to inform their normative and descriptive premises, Populists
have employed price theory to inform their own normative and descriptive
assumptions. Moreover, they have done so in a way that renders their posi,
tion vulnerable to advances in economic theory, in particular the NIE. As
a result, any attempt by Populists to rehabilitate their preferred approach
must rest upon either an empirical showing that vertical restraints are gen,
erally "forced" on dealers through market power or the construction of a
normative premise that is unrelated to price theory. Neither course
appears to be a particularly promising one for the Populists. Significant
empirical evidence seems to militate against their position, and the adop,
tion of premises that are divorced from price theory cannot justify the
results Populists seek without a substantial restructuring of antitrust law.

I.

PRICE THEORY COMETH

There can be little doubt that Chicagoans purport to rely upon price
theory as the sole foundation for their descriptive analysis-that is, for
determining the origin and effects of trade restraints. Writing nearly
twenty years ago, Richard Posner argued that Chicago differed from other
schools of antitrust analysis because it "view[ed] antitrust policy through
29
the lens of price theory." Other schools of thought, particularly the Popu,
list, or Harvard School, were, according to Chief Judge Posner, explicitly
noneconomic and thus unscientific:
lilt is still fair to ask why the application of price theory to antitrust should have been a novelty. The answer, l believe, is that in
the 1950s and early 1960s, industrial organization, the field of eco29. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of AntitTust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925,
928 (1979); see also Jacobs, supra note 5, at 228-29 (describing the price-theoretic basis for the
Chicago approach).
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nomics that studies monopoly questions, tended to be untheoretical,
descriptive, "institutional," and even metaphorical. Casual observa·
tion of business behavior, colorful characterizations (such as the term
"barrier to entry"), eclectic forays into sociology and psychology,
descriptive statistics, and verification by plausibility took the place of
careful definitions and parsimonious logical structure of economic
theory. The result was that industrial organization regularly
30
advanced propositions that contradicted economic theory.
Chicago, he continued, has vanquished this Harvard School, and "has
largely prevailed with respect to its basic point: that the proper lens for
31
viewing antitrust problems is price theory."
Similar sentiments are found in the writings of judge Robert Bork. In
1978, he noted that "to read antitrust literature or to participate in the
numerous conferences convened to discuss policy is to become convinced
that antitrust is less a discipline than a buzzing confusion of unrelated
32
opinion." ln order to avoid this confusion, he concluded, courts and academics had to rely upon price theory, which "enables us to identify, with an
acceptable degree of accuracy, those activities whose primary effect is out33
put restricting." According to judge Bork, there was simply no other way
to analyze trade practices:
There is no body of knowledge other than conventional price
theqry that can serve as a guide to the effects of business behavior
upon consumer welfare. To abandon economic theory is to abandon
34
the possibility of a rational antitrust law.
Indeed, according to Chicagoans, price theory could do more than
play a descriptive role, it could also supply the normative benchmark
against which the purely economic consequences of a restraint could be
35
measured. Chicagoans claimed that Congress designed the Sherman Act
36
to maximize "consumer welfare," which they took to mean total social
30. Posner, supra note 29, at 928-29.
31. ld. at 932.
32. BoRK, supra note 20, at 116; see also Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and
Consumer Welfare, 77 YALE L.J. 950, 952 (1968) (asserting that the contention "that r.p.m. creates efficient utilization of resources" is "grounded in basic price theory").
33. BoRK, supra note 20, at 116.
·
34. ld. at 117; see also Robert H. Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54
ANTITRUSTL.). 21,24 (1985).
35. See Jacobs, supra note 5, at 227-29 (demonstrating that Chicagoans view allocative
efficiency as "the exclusive goal of the antitrust laws").
36. See BoRK, supra note 20, at 72-89; Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of
the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966).
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wealth. Price theory, they said, supplied the only objective benchmark,
in the form of a partial equilibrium trade-off model, for determining
whether, on balance, a restraint enhances the allocation of society's
38
resources and thus increases or decreases total wealth. According to the
partial equilibrium model, a trade restraint could reduce total welfare only
if it distorted the allocation of resources in a way that destroyed wealth and
39
did not lead to efficiencies sufficient to offset that destruction. The mere
fact that a restraint enhanced a firm's market power and increased prices
did not, under this approach, necessarily render it unreasonable. After all,
Chicagoans pointed out, a transaction that produced substantial efficien10
cies could both increase prices and increase society's stock of wealth.
While an approach that countenanced restraints leading to higher prices
and greater profits might seem inconsistent with a goal of protecting consumers, one had to keep in mind that firms-and their shareholders-are
41
consumers too. Any departure from the objective "total welfare" benchmark would thus require judges to determine whether a certain amount of
wealth destruction was "worth" a mqre equitable distribution of income-a
42
quintessentially legislative function.
.
37. See BoRK, supra note 20, at 107-12; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in
Antitrust Law?, 60 TEx. L. REV. 705, 715 (1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Ratchet in Antitrust
Law]; Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1703-04 (1986)
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy]. Of course, this definition of"consumer welfare" constituted a classic application of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion. See Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 239 ( 1985).
38. See BoRK, supra note 20, at 107; see also Thomas C. Arthur, FareweU to the Sea of
Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Shennan Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263, 360-61 ( 1986) (describing
the partial equilibrium trade-off approach adopted by the Chicago School).
39. See BoRK, supra note 20, at 107-09; Wesley Liebler, Comments, 28 J.L. & ECON. 335,
335-36 (1985) (asserting that analysis under the Rule of Reason should "balance the gains from
increased efficiency against the losses from increased market power"); Oliver E. Williamson,
Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968); see also
HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, § 2.3, at 74-77.
40. See BoRK, supra note 20, at 108-10; Williamson, supra note 39, at 21.
41. See BoRK, supra note 20, at 81-83, 110-11. As Judge Easterbrook put it:
We cannot readily assume that monopoly profits land in the pockets of cats who
are already fat. Profits of big firms end up in federal coffers through taxes, and in the
hands of the meek, whose pension money is invested in stock. Some are captured by
unionized workers. Monopoly profits therefore may end up in the same sorts of pockets
from which they departed.
Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, supra note 37, at 1704.
42. See BoRK, supra note 20, at 110-12; Bork, supra note 34, at 24.
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THE POPULIST REACTION

Populists have responded swiftly to both strands of the Chicago
analysis, focusing their most vehement attacks on Chicago's prescriptions
regarding vertical restraints, particularly resale price maintenance (RPM)
43
and exclusive territories. As a normative matter, Populists take strong
exception to Chicago's claim that the Sherman Act should be read to condemn only those restraints that reduce the size of the economic pie. After
all, these critics point out, price theory, and the partial equilibrium tradeoff model that it produced, was a discipline unknown to those who wrote
44
and voted for the Sherman Act.
Thus, they conclude that allocative
efficiency cannot be the normative benchmark against which trade
45
restraints are measured. To find such a benchmark, they claim, one must
look elsewhere.
"Elsewhere" to Populists is the act's legislative history. As the Populists see things, a review of that history demonstrates that Congress
46
intended to protect a process of fair and open competition. Even practices
43.
See Ross, supra note 14, at 224 ("Probably the most controversial debate over anti·
trust doctrine today concerns vertical restraints. These agreements provoke the sharpest disparities between Chicago School efficiencianados and neo-populist advocates .... ").
44.
See RUOOLPH PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: 1888-1992, at 203 (1996);
Edward J. Hughes, The Left Side of Antitrust and Why It Matters, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 264, 273-74
(1994); David Millon, The Shennan Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 123334 (1988). lt should be noted that some scholars not associated with the Populist School agree
with this assessment. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L.
REV. l, 21 n.SS (1989); Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law and Economics, and the Courts, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 207-08 (1987); Frederick M. Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest: Separating
Wheat from Chaff, 86 YALE L.J. 974, 977 n.20 ( 1977).
See ROSS, supra note 14, at 9-10 (noting that "history suggests that today's efficiency
45.
concern with output was not the historical concern of Congress"); Eleanor Fox, The Politics of
Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Makirig: Antitrust as Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 566
( 1986) ("allocation efficiency was never a self-conscious goal of the Congresses that enacted and
strengthened the antitrust laws"); Hughes, supra note 44, at 273-74 ("To assume that Congress
was driven by abstract academic theories is difficult, but to suggest that Senators and
Representatives were somehow psychic in anticipating the hypotheses and formulas that would
later develop is absurd."); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 44, at 21-24; Kaplow, supra note 44, at
207-08.
46.
See John J. Flynn, Legal Reasoning, Antitrust Policy and the Social"Science" of Economics,
33 ANTITRUST BULL. 713 (1988).
Every competent and objective study of the legislative history of the antitrust laws indicates that they were passed with a series of qualitative political, social and economic
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that are efficient from the standpoint of the price,theoretic trade,off
47
model, they conclude, might interfere with such a process. Moreover,
Populists assert that subsequent legislative developments confirm this
48
interpretation of the act. While other scholars have disagreed with this
reading of the Sherman Act's original meaning, many at least agree with
the assertion that allocative efficiency was not the goal of those who
49
drafted the act.
The Populist attack on Chicago's descriptive approach was equally
sweeping. Here, Populists made use of a brilliant rhetorical technique.
Equating price theory with the economist's model of perfect competition,
Populists attributed to the Chicago School a belief that such a model accu,
50
rately describes the real world. Having constructed this straw man, many
goals or values in mind to guide their implementation. The overall goal is that a
"competitive process," not the quantitative concept of "competition," be the rule of
trade for big and small.
ld. at 719-20; see also Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 1140 ( 1981 ); Millon, supra note 44, passim; see also Harlan M Blake & William
K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 383-84 (1965); Harlan M. Blake &
William K. jones, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 422-36
( 1965) [hereinafter Blake & jones,
Goals of Antitrust].
47.
See THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 168-71 (1937); Fox,
supra note 46, at 1169-76; Millon, supra note 44, at 1282-83.
48.
In particular, Populists and others have focused upon Congress's repeal, in 1975, of the
McGuire and Miller-Tydings Acts, which had immunized resale price maintenance from antitrust
scrutiny if authorized by state law. McGuire Act, 66 Stat. 631 (1952) (repealed 1975); MillerTydings Act, 50 Stat. 693 ( 1937) (repealed 1975). See Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.l8 (1977); Lawrence Sullivan, Brief of the Small Business Legal Defense
Committee as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 12, 16, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914); HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, § 11.1, at 394
(calling the repeal of the federal law authorizing state fair trade laws "an ambiguous
Congressional mandate for making all resale price maintenance illegal"); ROSS, supra note 14, at
234 ("This fairly strong evidence of congressional intent suggests that, regardless of the policy
implications, resale price maintenance should remain per se illegal as a matter of statutory construction."); see also Burns, supra note 22, at 617-30 (arguing that the ubiquity of state and federal regulation of dealer-supplier relationships requires a rejection of the economic efficiency
approach to vertical restraints). It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has
expressly rejected the assertion that subsequent legislation is relevant in giving meaning to a
prior enactment. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 n.7 (1991)
("The 'will of Congress' we look to is not a will evolving from session to session, but a will
expressed and fixed in a particular enactment."); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560-67
( 1988) (rejecting the use of subsequent legislative history).
49.
See Hovenkamp, supra note 44, at 21-30; Lande, supra note 4, at 65 (arguing that the
Sherman Act was designed solely to nullify restraints that led to higher consumer prices, without
regard to allocative efficiency); see also Millon, supra note 44, at 1235 n.64 (explaining the disagreement between Populists and Professor Lande).
50. See Sullivan, Amicus Brief at 12, 16, Monsanto (No. 82-914) (asserting that the
Chicago approach to vertical restraints assumes perfect competition at the supplier and dealer
levels); William j. Curran lll, Beyond Economic Concepts and Categories: A Democratic
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Populists set out to demolish it, demonstrating-as if any demonstration
was necessary-that the real world departed in several respects from the
world portrayed by a perfect competition model.
Because the perfect competition model is characterized by a myriad of
limiting assumptions, demonstrating that such a model did not approxi,
mate the real world was a bit like shooting fish in a barrel, and Populists
51
and others were happy to "lock and load." Some emphasized that, con,
trary to the assumptions of the model, many firms do, in fact, possess mar,
52
ket power, often as a result of product differentiation or barriers to entry.
Others pointed out that the model was premised upon the absence of trans,
action costs, an unrealistic assumption in a world in which information and
53
bargaining are expensive. Indeed, one critic outside the Populist School
argued that in order to take Chicago's model seriously, one would have to
believe that no contract law was necessary in light of the absence of transRefiguration of Antitrust Law, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 349, 361-65 (1987); John J. Flynn, The "Is"
and "Ought" of Vertical Restraints After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 1095, 1135-37 (1986) [hereinafter Flynn, Vertical Restraints) (arguing that the Chicago
approach assumes free bargaining in a perfectly competitive market); John J. Flynn,
"Reaganomics" and Antitrust Enforcement: A Jurisprudential Critique, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 269, 293
(1983) [hereinafter Flynn, Antitrust Enforcement) (noting that the opinion in Syl11ania assumed
the existence of perfectly competitive markets); Flynn, supra note 46, at 718-19; Robert Pitofsky,
Does Antitrust Ha11e a Future?, 76 GEO. L.J. 321, 323 (1987) ("[Chicagoans) assume a kind of
perfect competition encountered only in theory, never in practice."); see also Jacobs, supra note
5, at 228-29 (describing Chicagoans as "working from a model of perfect competition founded in
neoclassical price theory").
51. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 5-7 (1968) (detailing
various assumptions of the perfect competition model); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF
PRICE 87-89 ( 1966) (same); George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J.
POL. ECON. 1 (1957) (describing the origins and development of the concept of perfect competition).
52. See Sullivan, Amicus Brief at 13-14, 16, Monsanto (No. 82-914); Curran, supra note
50, at 363-64; Flynn, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 50, at 293; Flynn, Vertical Restraints, supra
note 50, at 1 137; James F. Ponsoldt, The Enrichment of Sellers as a Justification for Vertical
Restraints: A Response to Chicago's Swiftian Modest Proposal, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1166, 1170
(1987); see also Fox & Sullivan, supra note 14, at 974-75.
53. See Sullivan, Amicus Brief at 16, Monsanto (No. 82-914) (asserting that the Chicago
approach assumes "fully informed buyers and sellers at every level"); Fox & Sullivan, supra note
14, at 958 (stating that the Chicago model assumes the existence of perfect information);
Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 233 (noting that the Chicago conclusion that vertical restraints
cannot enhance a supplier's market power depends upon an assumption of zero transaction
costs); Hughes, supra note 44, at 274 (asserting that the Chicago approach assumes perfect
information); Gordon B. Spivack, The Chicago School Approach to Single Firm Exercises of
Monopoly Power, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 651, 669-70 (1983) (same); Frank X. Taney, Rewriting the
Law of Resale Price Maintenance: The Kodak Decision and Transaction Cost Economics, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 321 (1994) (arguing that the Chicago approach to vertical restraints relies upon a neoclassical model that assumes the absence of transaction and information costs).
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action costs. Still others noted that the model did not account for externalities-that is, the uncompensated effects that a firm's decisions might
5
have on others. 5
Given the equation of price theory with perfect competition, these
critiques appeared devastating to any argument that price theory-which
Chicagoans claimed as the foundation of their analysis-is a useful tool for
evaluating the causes or origins of trade restraints. With Chicago's model
apparently "out of the way," Populists could return to their enterprise of
constructing an antitrust jurisprudence that protected the sort of fair and
56
open competitive process they believed Congress meant to preserve. The
result was a call for a return to the law of vertical restraints as it had existed
before the Chicago insurgency. Exclusive territories should be presumed
illegal, even absent proof of anticompetitive effect, because they interfere
57
with the ability of a trader to decide where to sell its goods. For similar
reasons, minimum and maximum resale price maintenance should remain
58
per se unlawful, and recent decisions that narrow the definition of the
offense or limit the class of plaintiffs that can challenge it should be overruled. 59
54.
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Rhetoric and Skepticism in Antitrust Argument, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 1721, 1728 n.43 (1986); cf. RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW
14 (1988) (noting that, in the absence of transaction costs, no law would be necessary).
See Donald Dewey, Antitrust and Economic Theory: An Uneasy Friendship, 87 YALE L.j.
55.
1516, 1517-18 (1978); Flynn, supra note 46, at 32; see also Sullivan, Amicus Brief at 22,
Monsanto (No. 82-914) (arguing that Chicagoans usually assert that externalities and market
failure will take care of themselves).
56.
See john j. Flynn, An Antitrust Allegory, 38 HASTINGS L.j. 517, 544 (1987); Fox, supra
note 46, passim; see also infra notes 135-167 and accompanying text (describing the Populist
approach).
57. See Flynn, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 50, at 293-94; Ponsoldt, supra note 52, at
1170; cf. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
58.
See Burns, supra note 22, at 651; james j. Flynn & james F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning
and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the
Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1125, 1143-45 (1987); Fox, supra note 46, at
1184 ("[T)he per se rule against vertical price-fixing reflects the value that sellers of goods should
have the freedom to charge the price that they see fit .... "); see also Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. john
D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
59. See Bums, supra note 22, at 617-50 (arguing that recent decisions limiting the ability
of distributors to challenge vertical restraints are misguided); Flynn, Vertical Restraints, supra note
50, passim; cf. supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (describing recent precedents hostile to
Populist approach); Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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REQUIEM FOR A STRAW MAN: PART I (DESCRIPTIVE)

As shown below, Populists have misunderstood the link between
neoclassical price theory, on the one hand, and Chicago's descriptive
approach, on the other. Simply put, the Populist claim that the Chicago
School employs a model of perfect competition is false; no Chicagoan has
explicitly or implicitly equated "price theory" with "perfect competition."
Moreover, the Chicago approach to vertical restraints does not depend on
price theory at all, but instead rests upon the NlE. An alternative to price
theory, NIE assumes-indeed, embraces-the very departures from the
world of perfect competition that Populists so heavily emphasize.
A.

What Perfect Competition Model?

One can read in vain the various general accounts by Chicagoans of
their descriptive methodology for any overt assumption that a model of
perfect competition accurately describes the real world, i.e., that by "price
theory" Chicagoans mean perfect competition. Judge Bork, for instance,
simply assumes that "price theory assures us that economic behavior is not
60
random but is primarily directed toward the maximization of profits," an
61
assumption that Populists themselves adopt. Judge Bork does not suggest
that market power cannot exist, that bargaining or information costs are
zero, or that there are no externalities. Similarly, in describing Chicago's
reliance upon price theory, Judge Posner makes no mention of the world of
perfect competition, nor does he appear to adopt any of the assumptions
62
that Populists have debunked.
It is possible that the lack of explicit reliance on a perfect competition
model is simply the result of careful drafting: perhaps Chicago's prescrip60.
BoRK, supra note 20, at 116.
61.
Professor John Flynn, for instance, argues that courts should presume that vertical
restraints are attempts by manufacturers to enhance their own market power by exacerbating
product differentiation. See Flynn, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 50, at 293. Presumably
profit maximization is the motive for such an enhancement. See also Lawrence Sullivan, Brief of
the Small Business Legal Defense Committee as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 14,
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914) (arguing that suppliers employ resale price maintenance to further differentiate their products and thus augment
their market power).
62.
See Posner, supra note 29, passim; cf. supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text
(describing the Populist attack on various assumptions associated with the perfect competition
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tions depend upon unrevealed, implicit premises about the nature of markets. Careful analysis, however, demonstrates that this is not the case.
After all, even Chicagoans call for intervention whenever application of
the partial equilibrium trade-off model predicts that a contract or other
63
practice will, on balance, destroy more wealth than it creates. Yet, in the
world of perfect competition, in which transaction costs are nonexistent,
no contract could ever result in a reduction in output, as the losers from
the resulting reduction in wealth would be willing to pay a firm or firms not
64
to adopt the offending practice. In other words, if Chicagoans assumed,
as Populists claim, that the real world looks like a perfect competition
model, they would assuredly adopt a criterion for judging trade restraints
different from output reduction-namely, complete laissez faire-which
65
Chicagoans have not done. Instead, they have explicitly characterized
the exercise of market power as an externality, one that antitrust law
66
should combat. In a perfectly competitive world, however, externalities
67
do not exist, for costless bargaining eliminates them. Chicago's assertion
that such externalities exist and that they should be combated rests at least
63. See BORK, supra note 20, ch. 3; POSNER, supra note 8, at 23-24; Easterbrook, Workable
Antitrust Policy, supra note 37, at 1702-05; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text
(describing application of the partial equilibrium trade-off model).
64.
See KENNETH G. ELZINGA & WILLIAM BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES ( 1976).
[I)n a world of no transactions or information costs (and one in which people did not
attempt to act as free riders), the benefits of competitive markets would be readily
secured. The customers of any monopolist would find it to their advantage to get
together and bribe the monopolist to behave like a competitive firm, producing at an
output where price is equal to marginal cost.
Id. at 6; see also Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A
Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 70 (1968) ("Assuming no transaction costs, those who lose from
the relative underproduction of monopolies could bribe monopolists to produce more."); George
J. Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12
(1972) ("The world of zero transaction costs turns out to be as strange as the physical world
would be with zero friction. Monopolies would be compensated to act like competitors, and
insurance companies and· banks would not exist.").
65. Cf. COASE, supra note 54.
What I showed in the Problem of Social Cost was that, in the absence of transaction
costs, it does not matter what the law is, since people can always negotiate without cost
to acquire, subdivide, and combine rights whenever this would increase the value of
production. In such a world the institutions which make up the economic system have
neither substance nor purpose.
ld. at 14-15.
66. See, e.g., ELZINGA & BREIT, supra note 64, at 3-7; Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rationalizing
Antitrust, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 329, 331 (1990) (analogizing high prices and allocative losses
associated with the cartel to externality of pollution); Stigler, supra note 64, at 11-12; see also
Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 320 ("I do not deny that some acts may be condemned without evi·
dence of market power; 1 do not doubt that much antitrust enforcement is beneficial.").
67. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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implicitly upon an assumption that the "real world" market can depart from
the one portrayed in perfect competition models.
Perhaps more tellingly, Chicago's account of the origins and purposes
of vertical restraints depends explicitly upon several departures from the
world as described by a perfect competition model. Take, for instance,
minimum resale price maintenance and exclusive territories. According to
Chicagoans, these restraints are often, perhaps predominantly, methods of
ensuring that dealers provide an optimal level of marketing effort at or near
68
the point of sale. This effort may consist of various presale services, such
as advertising and product demonstrations, or postsale services, such as
69
repair and maintenance work.
By providing its dealers with exclusive
territories, for instance, a manufacturer can ensure that those dealers cap~
ture the benefits of any effort they expend upon securing and retaining cus~
70
tomers. Similarly, by setting a floor below which retailers cannot price, a
manufacturer can effectively channel its dealers' competitive efforts into
nonprice competition, thereby ensuring an optimal amount of presale and
71
postsale service at the retail level.
Maximum resale price maintenance is a different story. By setting a
ceiling above which dealers cannot price, Chicagoans contend, manufac~
72
turers can prevent dealers from gouging consumers.
Such a policy,
moreover, can work hand~in~glove with attempts by the manufacturer to
establish a reputation among consumers as a low~price seller, by setting an
attractive price and then advertising to the ultimate consumer that dealers
73
will adhere to it.
68.
The classic statement of the Chicago position is found in Lester G. Telser, Why Should
Manufacturers Want Fair Trcuk?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960). Telser's account has been uniformly
followed by members of the Chicago School. See infra note 80.
69.
See BoRK, supra note 20, at 290 (arguing that resale price maintenance induces presale services); Kevin J. Arquit, Resale Price Maintenance: Consumer Friend or Foe?, 60 ANTITRUST
L.J. 447, 453 (1991) (describing how resale price maintenance can induce dealers to supply aftermarket services); Baxter, supra note 20, at 946 (asserting that vertical restraints can facilitate the
provision of "point of sale instruction, postsale warranty services, [and) local advertising").
70.
See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 430-38 (1966); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the
Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1977) . .
71.
See BORK, supra note 20, at 290 ("A retailer whose price is controlled will have to vie
for business by sales and service effort."); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme
Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition
Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 283-85 (1975).
72. See Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1362 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A supplier
might ... fix a maximum resale price in order to prevent his dealers from exploiting a monopoly
position."); BoRK, supra note 20, at 438-49.
73.
See Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 706 (7th Cir.
1986) (Posner, J.) (describing such a strategy); Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, supra note 20,
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Nothing about these accounts depends explicitly or implicitly upon
74
any of the assumptions of the perfect competition model. To the contrary, Chicago's approach to these restraints explicitly assumes several
departures from perfect competition. 75 Take, for example, market power.
Contrary to Populist contentions, Chicago's prescriptions in no way
depend upon the assumption that manufacturers do not possess such
76
power. Instead, the necessity of inducing dealers to provide information
to consumers depends upon the existence of product differentiation, differ77
entiation that creates some degree of market power. Absent such differentiation, no advertising or other provision of information would be
78
necessary.
The presence of some market power, then, is a sine qua non of a verti·
cal restraint under the Chicago account.· This assumption is more than
implicit. For instance, Professor Lester Telser's classic article explaining
why minimum resale price maintenance might be a beneficial practice
explicitly limited its conclusions to those instances in which manufacturers
were selling a differentiated product and thus possessed some degree of
79
market power. The Chicago School has universally adopted this article as
the starting point for its approach to such restraints and, in so doing, has
at 892-95. Of course, this is not the only possible benefit of maximum resale price maintenance.
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 121-22.
74.
See supra note 51 (outlining sources that discuss assumptions of the perfect competi·
tion model). One exception is the assumption that firms attempt to maximize profits. That,
however, is also an assumption that Populists adopt. See supra note 61.
75.
See Baxter, supra note 20, at 948 (arguing that vertical restraints are methods of over·
coming market imperfections); Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra note 20, at 150 nJO.
76.
See supra note 50 (recounting the Populist assertion that Chicago approach assumes
the absence of market power).
77.
See Telser, supra note 68, at 87.
See id. The Chicago account of maximum resale price maintenance, of course, also
78.
depends upon the presence of some market power due to product differentiation. Absent such
power, dealers would be in no position to exploit consumers. See, e.g., Khan v. State Oil Co., 93
FJd 1358, 1362 (7th Cir. 1996) (arguing that the manufacturer's brand name might be
"sufficiently distinctive and popular ... to give the dealers in it at least a modicum of monopoly
power," thus justifying maximum resale price maintenance); BORK, supra note 20, at 438-39;
Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, supra note 20, at 892-93 (assuming that some retailers can
price above cost).
79.
See Telser, supra note 68, at 87 ("[A) necessary condition to a manufacturer's use of
resale price maintenance is that he must possess some degree of monopoly control over the price
of the product because his product is differentiated in economically relevant respects from com·
peting products."); see also id. at 95; Bork, supra note 32, at 961 (asserting that the Chicago
approach does not "posit any degree of ease or difficulty of entry").
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not called into question its assumption regarding market power. ln fact,
some Chicagoans have extrapolated upon Professor Telser's original argu·
ment by suggesting that minimum resale price maintenance and exclusive
territories can themselves assist in the process by which a manufacturer
differentiates its product from others by, for instance, encouraging advertis·
81
ing or associating a product with a stylish retailer. Finally, two of the
most prominent Chicagoans, Judges Bork and Posner, have explicitly
argued that vertical restraints should be legal, even when defendants have
82
significant market power.
Indeed, some Populists seem to be aware that the logic of the Chicago
position depends upon the presence of differentiated products, and hence,
market power. One of the earliest criticisms of the Chicago approach to
minimum RPM and exclusive territories, leveled by Populists and others,
was. that advertising and the resulting product differentiation and market
power were socially wasteful, and therefore should not be encouraged by
83
lenient treatment of vertical restraints. Others have asserted that the
Chicago approach cannot explain all of these restraints because some mar84
kets are not characterized by product differentiation. These criticisms, on
which some Populists still rely, seem inconsistent with the simultaneous
assertion that Chicagoans premise their prescriptions regarding vertical
restraints upon the existence of perfect competition, particularly in light of
the statements by Professor Telser and others to the contrary.
80.
Reliance on Telser's article by members of the Chicago School is universal. See, e.g.,
BaRK, supra note 20, at 290-91; POSNER, supra note 8, at 148; Bork, supra note 70, at 453-54;
Easterbrook, Vertical Restrictions, supra note 20, at 149-50 n.25.
See William F. Baxter, Vertical Practices: Half Slave, Half Free, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 743,
81.
747-50 ( 1983); Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra note 20, at 150.
82.
See Khan, 93 F.3d at 1362-64 (concluding that maximum resale price maintenance
should be lawful even though product differentiation confers some market power on the manufacturer); BaRK, supra note 20, at 288 ("[A]nalysis shows that every vertical restraint should be
completely lawful."); id. at 289 (noting that the presence of market power does not alter this
conclusion); Posner, supra note 20, at 22-23 (commenting that minimum resale price maintenance and exclusive territories should be per se legal, even if the supplier has market power).
See William S. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor
83.
and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1429-30 (1968); Flynn, Antitrust Enforcement, supra
note 50, at 293 (arguing that, in many cases, vertical restraints are a "means for promoting
artificial product differentiation based on advertising and promotional gimmickry"); Donald F.
Turner, Advertising and Competition 26 FED. B.J. 93 (1966); see also Posner, supra note 70, at 4
("One reason why Telser's analysis was not more influential [in the 1960s] is that many
economists viewed the presale services encouraged by resale price maintenance and cognate
nonprice restrictions as of dubious value to consumers .... ").
84.
See ROSS, supra note 14, at 232 & n.7. But cf. Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher &
Co., 37 F.3d 996, 1002 (3d Cir. 1994) (describing free riding by no-frills wallpaper dealers) ..
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Similarly, Chicagoans do not assume that the relevant parties have
85
perfect information about the product governed by the restraint. Instead,
the Chicago account explicitly depends on the existence of imperfect
information about the products involved. After all, one purpose of mini·
mum RPM and exclusive territories, according to Chicago, is to induce
86
dealers to provide information to consumers about product attributes. If
consumers were fully informed about the qualities of various products, there
would be no need for manufacturers to induce retailers to provide infor87
mation about them. Similarly, if customers had perfect information about
the prices charged by various manufacturers and individual retailers, there
would be no reason for manufacturers to advertise, and thus no need for
assuring, through maximum resale price maintenance, that the prices
88
charged by retailers match those advertised. "Proof" by Populists that the
economy is not characterized by perfect information, then, only reinforces
Chicago's conclusion about the origin of vertical restraints.
Finally, the Chicago account of these contracts assumes that the relationship between manufacturers and dealers is characterized by significant
market failure in the form of externalities that result from high bargaining
89
costs. Consider minimum resale price maintenance and exclusive terri·
tories. By choosing not to distribute their own goods, and instead relying
upon market transactions with dealers to do so, manufacturers leave deci·
85. See supra note 53 (documenting the Populist assertion that the Chicago account
depends upon possession of perfect information by buyers and sellers).
86. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 SUP. CT. REV.
171.
There are a variety of ways in which restraints may enhance efficiency. The one
most commonly discussed in the literature is the optimization of dealer sales effort,
including the provision of infonnation to consumers. All selling involves the provision of
information and persuasion. The more detailed the information, the more efficient it
will be to provide it at the point of sale to persons who have identified themselves as
potential buyers and who, in addition, may have questions not easily anticipated and
addressed in mass market advertising.
ld. at 181 (emphasis added); see also Victor P. Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing,
and the Economics of Retailing Services, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 736, 744-48 (1984).
87. See Telser, supra note 68, at 95 ("Only branded products that are unfamiliar to the
mass of consumers are price maintenance candidates on (the special services) argument."); see
also id. ("New branded products are obviously unfamiliar to the mass of consumers and are,
thereby, candidates for resale price maintenance."); Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra
note 20, at 150 n.30 ("The Telser approach to restricted dealing rests on the high costs of infor·
mation. Restricted dealing may be a beneficial response to the high cost of conveying (and
establishing property rights in) information."); Goldberg, supra note 86, at 744-48.
88. See Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, supra note 20, at 892-94.
89. See supra notes 52-SS (describing the Populist assertion that Chicago approach
assumes no market failure); see also Coase, supra note 67 (noting that the existence of transaction
costs a sine qua non of externalities).
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sions over the appropriate amount of marketing effort in the hands of such
90
retailers. This effort by dealers, however, is a classic collective good: the
benefits of such effort cannot be confined to the dealer that provides it, but
91
instead flow to other dealers as well. The production of that good, like
any other collective good, will be characterized by opportunistic behavior,
dubbed "free riding," a~ price-cutting dealers lure customers away from
92
other dealers who have invested heavily in marketing effort. Such free
riding results in a market failure-suboptimal production of servicesthereby diluting the reputation of the manufacturer's product, reducing
demand for it and, hence, its salesY
Market failure, of course, cannot persist in the absence of bargaining
94
costs.
Absent such costs, dealers and manufacturers would constantly
bargain among themselves to ensure that each retailer provided the opti95
mal amount of service at any particular point in time. In the real world,
however, these costs do exist, thereby necessitating some mechanism for
96
governing relationships different from constant haggling. Exclusive territories and minimum resale price maintenance, of course, are just such a
97
mechanism.
Chicago's account of maximum resale price maintenance also depends
upon the presence of bargaining costs that lead to market failure and thus
make reliance upon market transactions expensive. When determining
90. See Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L.
REV. 521, 575 (1981).
91.
See J. RONNIE DAVIS & CHARLES W. MEYER, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC FINANCE 25
(1983) (defining "collective good"); MANCUR OLSON, THE LCXJIC OFCOLLECfiVE ACfiON 1416 (1965) (same).
92. See OLSON, supra note 91, at 27 ("Normally the provision of [a) collective good will be
strikingly suboptimal .... "); see also BoRK, supra note 20, at 290-91 ("[Absent some vertical
restraint) customers will be able to go to the retailer who offers display of the full line, explanation of the product, and so forth, and then purchase from the retailer who offers none of these
things but gives a lower price."); Posner, supra note 71, at 285.
.
93. See BoRK, supra note 20, at 290; Telser, supra note 68, at 91-92.
94. See Kenneth Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice
of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS 59, 60
(1970) ("[M)arket failure is not absolute; it is better to consider a broader category, that of transaction costs which in general impede and in particular cases block the formation of markets.");
Oliver Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM.
ECON. REV. 112 (1971).
95. See COASE, supra note 54, at 14-15; see also Baxter, supra note 20, at 948.
96. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, in 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
97. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACfiNG 185-89 (1985); Victor P. Goldberg, The Law and
Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective, 58 TEx. L. REV. 91 (1979); Oliver
Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost
Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953,976-80 (1978).
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what price to charge for the manufacturer's product, dealers do not fully
internalize the effect that such prices will have on the manufacturer's reputation or, for that matter, the higher advertising costs that the manufacurer
98
must incur as a result.
In the absence of bargaining costs, the
manufacturer and dealer could jointly determine the price of each item
sold, thereby ensuring that the price charged by the dealer fully reflected
99
the relevant costs to the manufacturer and other dealers. Bargaining costs
do exist, however, and allocation to the manufacturer of the authority to
limit the price that the dealer can charge may be necessary to minimize
these costs.
Chicago's case for vertical restraints, then, depends upon the presence
of bargaining costs and the resulting market failure that would accompany
unfettered reliance upon dealers' judgments as to the manner of product
100
distribution.
While most Chicagoans do not explicitly refer to market
failure or, for that matter, bargaining costs, some do. There can be no
doubt that all Chicago work in this area at least implicitly assumes the
101
Indeed, economists that do justify vertical
presence of such costs.
102
restraints on these grounds cite the work of Chicagoans! Recognition of,
and indeed, reliance upon, the presence of such costs further refutes the
assertion that the Chicago approach depends upon a perfect competition
model.
B.

Fronting for the New Institutional Economics

It should be apparent that the Chicago approach to vertical restraints
has little to do with a model of perfect competition, or, for that matter,
98.
See Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 706 (7th Cir.
1986); Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, supra note 20, ar 892-95; cf. Alan J. Meese, Antitrust
Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REV.
111, 117-20 (1996) (explaining how franchisees might not fully internalize the effects that their
decisions as to quality might have on the franchisor's repuration).
See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
99.
100. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 86.
[S)ome dealers will perceive that they can let others incur the cost of persuasion and
capture the customer by offering a lower price. Such dealers take a free ride. If free
riding becomes common, no dealer will find it worthwhile to provide the sales effort
that would otherwise be optimal.
ld. at 181; see also Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, supra note 20, at 892-95.
101. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 20, at 948 (arguing that vertical restraints are a response
to transaction costs); Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra note 20, at 150 (same).
102.
See WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 185 n.22 (recognizing that Telser's work formed
the foundation of the transaction cost approach); Williamson, supra note 97, at 956 (citing
Telser and Posner for the proposition that vertical restrictions minimize free-rider-related
transaction costs).
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with price theory. Despite all of its self-congratulatory "reliance" upon
price theory, the Chicago approach to such restraints in fact constitutes an
application of, or perhaps an anticipation of, the so-called NIE associated
103
with Ronald Cease and Professor Oliver Williamson.
This school of
thought explicitly and emphatically rejects price theory and its perfect
104
competition model, adopting in its stead the world as it really exists.
In the real world, the New Institutionalists argue, the tools of price
theory are woefully inadequate for the task of determining the causes and
origins of trade restraints. In their view, price theorists improperly charac105
terize the firm as a "black box," surrounded by a chaotic market. Its existence is taken as a given, as is the distinction between what it produces for
106
itself and what it purchases from others.
Given these premises, New
Institutionalists contend that price theorists naturally view with suspiCion
a manufacturer's attempt to influence by contract the marketing decisions
of its dealers or customers.
To the New Institutionalists, by contrast, the boundary between the
firm and the market ought not be taken as a given. Instead, those seeking
to explain complex trade practices must first ask why firms exist at all, and
then apply the answer to analyze attempts by firms to extend their control
107
Firms exist, the New Institutionalists say, to
into adjacent markets.
103. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 1-14; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES 1-19 {1975); Coase, supra note 96, passim.
104. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 1-85; see also id. at 2, 12 {noting that transactioncost economics and neoclassical economics are "rival[s)"); Ronald H. Coase, Industrial
Organization: A Proposal for Research, reprinted in RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET,
AND THE LAW 59-60 {1988) {criticizing the price-theoretic approach to industrial organization);
COASE, supra note 54, at 28-29 {criticizing undue reliance by economists on "blackboard economics").
105. See Richard Langlois, Contract, Competition, and Efficiency, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 834
{1989) {"[T[he economist's firm-at least until recently-was a black box, a production function
that took in inputs and transformed them into outputs.").
106. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 97.
The prevailing orientation toward economic organization [ordained by price theory) was
that technological features of firm and market organization were determinative. The
allocation of economic activities as between firms and markets was taken as a datum;
firms were characterized as production functions; markets served as signalling devices;
contracting was accomplished through an auctioneer; and disputes were disregarded
.
because of the presumed efficacy of court adjudication.
Id. at 7; see also id. at 86-90; George Stigler, The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the
Market, 59 J. POL. ECON. 185 {1951) {noting that economists "have generally treated as technological datum the problem of what the firm does-what governs its range of activities or
functions").
107. See Steven Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 j.L. & ECON. 1-5 {1983);
Coase, supra note 96, at 390 {"H~ving regard to the fact that, if production is regulated by price
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avoid the costs of the alternative, namely, reliance upon the market to
108
conduct economic activity. More precisely, in deciding whether to integrate vertically-that is, whether to produce an item internally that could
be procured in the market-firms must compare the cost of internal
production with the cost of transacting, a cost that includes discovering
trading partners and prices, negotiation of contracts, and the possibility
109
that one's trading partners will engage in opportunistic behavior.
Furthermore, the New Institutionalists emphasize, such vertical integration is
110
not an all~or-nothing proposition.
Instead, firms may often choose to
integrate only partially, by contract, thus obtaining many of the benefits of
integration without some of its costs.
In the real world-full of differentiated products, information costs,
bargaining costs, and highly imperfect mechanisms for enforcing otherwise
clear contracts-the cost of transacting can be extremely high. This world,
the New Institutionalists contend, leads firms to adopt complex contractual mechanisms to overcome or mitigate various market failures that
would attend complete reliance upon the market, mechanisms that price
111
theory can explain only with reference to an exercise of monopoly power.
movements, production could be carried on without any organization at all, well might we ask,
'Why is there any organization?"').
108. See Coase, supra note 96, at 390 ("The main reason why it is profitable to establish a
firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.").
109. See Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271 (1987).
The older theory of the firm as production function gradually made way (or gave way)
to a theory of the firm in which express allowance was made for transaction costs.
Accordingly, the firm was thereafter described as a governance structure .... Tech·
nology was no longer determinative, the boundaries of the firm (what to make, what to
buy, how to trade, etc.) now needed to be derived.
ld. at 273; see also WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 15-18.
110. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 27 (1988);
Coase, supra note 96, at 388 n.9, 392 n.1; see also Cheung, supra note 107.
The polar cases are complicated by middlemen and subcontractors; agents contract
among themselves; and any type of input may support a variety of contractual arrange•
ments. We surmise that these very complications, which render 'the firm' ambiguous,
have arisen ftom attempts to save transaction costs there were not avoidable in the
polar cases.
ld. at 19; see also Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 326 (1978) ("[The] primary distinction
between transactions made within a firm and transactions made in the market place may be too
simplistic. Many long term relationships ... blur the distinction between market and the firm.").
111.
See WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 15-29. The following remarks by Professor Coase
exemplify the attitude of the New Institutionalists toward theories based on perfect competition:
If an economist finds something-a business practice of some sort or another-that he
does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as we are very ignorant
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When one clears away the underbrush associated with Chicago's
"reliance" upon "price theory," there is very little difference between the
New Institutionalists, on the one hand, and Chicagoans, on the other. A
summary, by then-Professor Frank Easterbrook, of various Chicago-oriented
approaches to vertical restraints, particularly minimum resale price maintenance and exclusive territories, demonstrates the similarity between
Chicagoans and practitioners of NIE:
All of these approaches, like Lester Telser's, show how the costs of
organizing a market and conveying information lead to forms of
organization that depart from the textbook model of atomistic competition. These departures are not "failures." On the contrary, they
are evidence that markets adapt to the costs of organization and
information in a way that economizes on all costs, including the
112
costs of the markets themselves.

The Chicago approach is more than simply an application of the NIE:
it is an anticipation of it. Compare, for instance, two statements-one by
Professor Williamson, made in 1985, summarizing the way in which the
NIE interprets nonstandard contracts, such as vertical restraints, and one
by then-Professor Bork, made in 1968, describing the origins and purposes
of minimum resale price maintenance:
Thus, whereas the monopoly branch of contract interprets nonstandard forms of exchange as having monopoly purpose and effect, the
property rights literature would inquire whether mistaken property
rights assignments were responsible for resource misallocations.
Redescribing property rights possibly in complex (nonstandard)
ways, is what explains contractual irregularities. Put differently, discrete market contracting is supplanted by more complex forms of
contracting, because that is the way residual rights to control can be
placed in the hands of those who can use those rights most produc. ly. 113
ttve
in this field, the number of ununderstandable practices tends to be rather large, and the
reliance on monopoly explanations is frequent.
Coase, supra note 104, at 60-61. By "economist," of course, Professor Coase means price
theorist.
112. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangement.\ supra note 20, at 150.; see also Baxter, supra note 20.
Vertical arrangements of the kind discussed here should be seen in the context of the
theory of the firm and as extensions of the firm. Vertical arrangements are instances of
incomplete resource internalization, of partial vertical integration-instances in which
the underlying market failure the arrangement addresses can be dealt with more effec·
tively through the looser arrangement of contract.
ld. at 948; see also Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, supra note 20, 892-95.
113.
WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 27.
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R.p.m., like vertical market division, is the means by which the
manufacturer induces reseller provision of [services] by making sure
that the reseller can recover the [services'] cost. The process is
closely analogous to the social recognition of property rights as a
means of inducing economic activities. Contract law delegates to
private persons the power to create property rights because of their
superior knowledge of the efficiencies to be gained in particular
situations. R.p.m. is best seen as an instance of this general
. . l e. 114
prmc1p

Thus, despite its own misleading rhetoric, Chicago's descriptive
approach to vertical restraints simply does not depend upon a model of
perfect competition, or, for that matter, neoclassical price theory. Instead,
it begins with an appreciation of the real world and how that world might
lead firms to adopt contractual methods of reducing the costs of transact115
ing-that is, of relying upon the market to distribute products.
This is
not to say that Chicagoans and New Institutionalists have identified the
only possible explanation for the origin and purposes of such restraints.
One could believe that some vertical restraints are designed to minimize
the costs of transacting, but that most such contracts have purely anticompetitive purposes or effects. Or, one could believe that even those
restraints designed to overcome transaction costs are, on balance, anticompetitive. Only an empirical inquiry can determine the true origins and
effects of such restraints.
Regardless of the outcome of such an inquiry, however, one thing is
clear: The Populist assertion that the Chicago account of vertical restraints
depends upon a perfect competition model drawn from neoclassical price
theory is simply false. While Chicago's descriptive approach does depend
upon an economic theory, it is a theory that accounts for and, indeed,
depends upon, the various departures from perfect competition that Populists are so quick to emphasize. Proof that the real world departs from that
described by the model of perfect competition, then, in no way undermines
the Chicago account of the purpose that vertical restraints might serve.
Nor, for that matter, does such proof suggest that the Chicago account does
116
not describe the predominant function of such agreements.
114.
Bork, supra note 32, at 956; see also id. at 963 ("[Resale price maintenance) is a ubiqui·
tous form of integration known as contract integration and has great advantages in many situa·
tions over ownership integration.") (citing Coase, supra note 96).
115.
See Langlois, supra note 105, at 831, 836 ("[T)he classic Chicago explanation for resale
price maintenance is a relatively complex story involving the transaction costs of policing the
sales effort of retailers.").
116.
One could argue that the agitation by some Chicagoans for a rule of per se legality for
vertical restraints depends upon a view that retail markets are always competitive, with the result
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REQUIEMFORASTRAWMAN: PART II (NORMATIVE)

The mere fact that the Chicago School's descriptive conclusions rest
upon a real-world model does not mean that one must accept its ultimate
legal conclusions. One could agree entirely with Chicago's analysis of the
origins and economic effects of certain restraints, but draw different con117
clusions about the normative consequences of those findings.
Indeed,
Chicagoans are not alone in their embrace of the NIE. Populists, for
instance, sometimes invoke Professor Williamson's work in their attacks
118
against Chicago.
Perhaps, then, Chicago's descriptive conclusions, if
combined with Populist normative premises, require a reaffirmation of
Populist results.
An example from merger law provides a useful analogy. Populists and
Chicagoans might agree that mergers in highly concentrated industries both
119
create productive efficiencies and lead to increased prices.
Each camp,
however, would draw radically different conclusions from this realization.
To Populists, who view the antitrust laws as designed to prevent aggregations of power and transfers of wealth from consumers to producers, such a
conclusion would require, at the least, a strong presumption against such
12
mergers. ° Chicagoans, by contrast, would view such mergers as creating
that cartels among dealers are not possible. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 20, at 23-24 {asserting
that dealer cartels are rare because retail markets are generally unconcentrated and entry is easy).
Careful reading of these Chicagoans suggests that this assumption is not logically necessary to
their argument. Instead, this prescription depends upon an assertion that true retailer cartels can
be effectively detected and punished as horizontal agreements. See Posner, supra note 20, at 16-17, 24 {concluding that retailer cartels should be attacked directly and not under the guise of
restrictions on purely vertical arrangements). This assumption may be incorrect, but it has
nothing to do with the perfect competition model.
See Curran, supra note 50, at 351 {"Economics cannot define markets and rules for
117.
competition that then determine ideal life; at best it can define alternative means for providing
products and services. Economics can no more define a single superior market instrumentality
than it can defend the superiority of a Pareto efficient society."); Flynn, supra note 46, at 714-19
{asserting that economic theory cannot automatically supply the normative content of antitrust);
see also Burns, supra note 22, passim {assuming that the modern approach to vertical restraints
depends upon a view that economic efficiency is the sole goal of antitrust).
118.
See, e.g., Flynn, Vertical Restraints, supra note 50, at 1130 n.191 {purportedly contrast·
ing views of Chicagoans with those of "professional economists," such as Oliver Williamson). It
should be noted that Professor Williamson has taken positions directly contrary to the Populist
approach to vertical restraints. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 183-89. He is not the only
professional economist to do so. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 86, at 756--57.
119. See Williamson, supra note 39, at 21.
120. See David W. Barnes, Nonefficiency Goals in the Antitrust Law of Mergers, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 787 {1989); Joseph F. Bradley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency,
Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1035-36 {1987); Millon,
supra note 44, passim; see also Lande, supra note 4, at 65. Indeed, to the extent that Populists are
concerned that excess profits might lead to undue political influence, the presence of efficiencies
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more wealth than they destroy, thus leading to a strong presumption in
121
their favor.
Agreement on the purely economic ofigins and conse,
quences of a restraint, then, does not necessarily lead to agreement over
the appropriate legal treatment.
So it is, apparently, with vertical restraints. Populists have asserted
that even if Chicago's descriptive assertions are correct, adoption of the
proper normative premises governing the antitrust laws requires a rejection
of the Chicago approach. To be precise, Populists argue that Chicago's
conclusions depenq upon the assumption that allocative efficiency is the
sole goal of the antitrust laws. Moreover, Populists claim that adoption of
their own standard for judging trade restraints-protection of the competi,
tive process-requires an approach far more hostile to vertical restraints.
As shown below, however, Populists are incorrect on both counts.
A.

A Normative Approach to Vertical Restraints?

1.

Rejecting the Efficiency Standard

As suggested earlier, Populists are certainly correct that the Chicago
School of antitrust purports to depend upon an allocative efficiency stan,
122
dard for evaluating trade restraints.
Judge Bork has made the strongest
case for this approach to the antitrust laws, arguing that the legislative his,
tory of the Sherman Act shows that its drafters were primarily concerned
with preventing arrangements that increase consumer prices and thus dis,
tort the allocation of resources, leaving those arrangements that encourage
123
efficient methods of production unscathed. Such an approach, combined
with Chicago's descriptive story about the origins of vertical restraints,
leads Chicagoans to the conclusion that such restraints should be presumed

lawful.l24
that inure in part to the benefit of the newly created firm may actually further militate against the
transaction.
121.
See BoRK, supra note 20, at 110-12; POSNER, supra note 8, at 111-12; Williamson,
supra note 39, at 21 (demonstrating that a merger to monopoly that creates modest efficiencies
almost invariably increases total wealth).
122.
See BoRK, supra note 20, at 107-15; see also supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
123. See Bork, supra note 36, at 7.
124. See BoRK, supra note 20, at 296-97 (arguing that vertical restraints cannot reduce
output); Posner, supra note 20, at 22-23 (arguing that minimum resale price maintenance and
exclusive territories cannot be anticompetitive). It should be noted that not all scholars agree
with the Chicago assertion that vertical restraints are necessarily wealth maximizing . See, e.g.,
Comanor, supra note 83 (contending that exclusive territories lead to net welfare losses); Warren
S. Grimes, Spiff, Polish, and Consumer Demand Quality: Vertical Price Restraints Revisited, 80 CAL.
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Of course, Populists and others explicitly reject an allocative effi~
125
ciency standard for evaluating trade restraints for several reasons.
As
noted earlier, neither the legislators who drafted the Sherman Act nor
their contemporaries in the economics profession understood the nature of
126
Alfred Marshall had just published his Principles of
allocative efficiency.
Economics, and prior works anticipating Marshall's had not been generally
127
available to Americans.
Thus, the Congress of 1890 simply could not
have subjectively intended to implement an allocative efficiency approach
128
to trade restraints.
Judge Bork' s attempt to demonstrate the contrary,
129
Populists and others say, is flatly wrong.
Thus far, this interpretive approach has an odd ring to it, sounding
130
Populists seem
like a form of "specific intent" or "one~step" originalism.
to assume that courts have no authority to reach results different from
131
those specifically contemplated by the drafters of a statute. This method
of interpretation has largely been discredited in other contexts. Many of
the most vociferous proponents of originalism concede that courts may
132
reach results at odds with those initially anticipated by a text's drafters.
L. REV. 817 (1992) (arguing that, even when judged solely under an allocative efficiency stan·
dard, minimum resale price maintenance should be condemned).
125. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
126. See Hovenkamp, supra note 44, at 21-22; Hughes, supra note 44, at 273-74; Kaplow,
supra note 44, at 207-08; Scherer, supra note 44, at 977 n.20; see also Millon, supra note 44, at
1233-34.
127. See Hovenkamp, supra note 44, at 21 n.SS; Scherer, supra note 44, at 977 n.20.
128. See Hughes, supra note 44, at 273-74 ("To assume that Congress was driven by
abstract academic theories is difficult, but to suggest that Senators and Representatives were
somehow psychic in anticipating the hypotheses and formulas that would later develope is
absurd.").
129. · See Hovenkamp, supra note 44, at 22 ("Bork's analysis of the legislative history was
strained [and) heavily governed by his own ideological agenda .... Not a single statement in the
legislative history comes close to stating the conclusions that Bork drew."); Hughes, supra note
44, at 274 (asserting that "subsequent scholarship has clearly demonstrated that Bork's work is
not a respectable piece of historical research").
130. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1165 (1993)
(distinguishing between "one·step" and "two-step" originalism).
131. For application of this approach in other contexts, see, for example, McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (arguing that execution should be
ipso facto a constitutional method of punishment because the founders contemplated its appli·
cation); Raoul Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation": The Activist Flight from the Constitution, 47
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 25 ( 1986) (stating that "a construction which would give the phrase ... a mean·
ing different from the sense in which it was understood and employed by the people when they
adopted the Constitution, would be as unconstitutional as a departure from the plain and express
language of the Constitution").
132. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McGlaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 62, n.1 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Oilman v. Evans & Novak, 750 F.2d 970,996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane) (Bork, J.,
concurring); Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 359-60
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As these jurists and scholars point out, the application of a text contemplated by its drafters depends upon certain legal or factual presupposi133
tions-suppositions that may change over time.
Originalism in the
antitrust context, then, might require the interpreter to ask what sort of
results the drafters would have contemplated if they had understood the
134
allocative efficiency paradigm.
Populists, however, do not rest solely upon their conclusion that the
Sherman Act's drafters did not understand the allocative efficiency paradigm. They are also quick to assert that the drafters had an affirmative
program, that is, to outlaw those contracts that interfere with a fair and
135
open competitive process.
This type of process, they claim, simultaneously implements the economic, social, and political goals that originally
136
motivated Congress to pass the Sherman Act.
It is certainly possible,
Populists concede, that protection of such a process leads to less efficient
(1992); Antonin Scalia, Ve~oht Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court,
1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 381-82.
133.
See, e.g., McGlaughlin, 500 U.S. at 62 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that changes in
technology can require applications of the Fourth Amendment different from those contemplated by the framers); Oilman, 750 F.2d at 996 (Bork, j., concurring) (suggesting that "[courts
ought) to ensure that the powers and freedoms the framers specified are made effective in today's
circumstances").
134. See Lessig, supra note 130, at 1247-51. As the Supreme Court has put it in another
context: "The Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era.
In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to
historic notions of equality." Harper v. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 ( 1966). Similarly, Chicagoans might argue that there is no reason that the Court, in interpreting the Sherman
Act, must be confined .to historic notions of economics. See William Baxter, The Common Law
Nature of Antitrust, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661,669-73 (1982); Bork, supra note 36.
Nothing in the legislative history or in the language of the statute suggests that courts
are required to hold any specific type of agreement or behavior unlawful regardless of its
primary impact on consumers. In terms of "law," therefore, the Sherman Act tells
judges very little. A judge who feels compelled to a particular result regardless of the
teachings of economic theory deceives himself and abdicates his delegated responsibility. That responsibility is nothing less than the awesome task of continually creating
and recreating the Sherman Act out of his understanding of economics and his conception of the requirements of the judicial process.
Id. at 48.
See Flynn, supra note 46, at 719-22; Fox, supra note 46, at 1152; see also jOEL B.
135.
DIRLAM & ALFRED E. KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION 15-17 (1954); Barnes, supra note 120, at 84148; Blake & jones, The Goals of Antitrust, supra note 46, at 422-36; Eugene Rostow, The New
Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 567 ( 1947) (arguing for interpretations of the Act that emphasize deconcentration of economic and political power).
See DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 135, at 15-17; KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 7, at
136.
14-16; Flynn, supra note 46, at 719-20; Fox, supra note 46, at 1169; Fox & Sullivan, supra note
14, at 940-42; Rudolph j. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263,31116; see also Bums, supra note 22, passim.
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outcomes, and thus less wealth, than an allocative efficiency approach. If
so, adoption of a process-oriented approach requires a court to sacrifice
138
some wealth for other values.
Ultimately, however, such a trade-off is
more illusory than real, they maintain. The tools of modem economics,
Populists argue, cannot, in the end, determine which standard-partial
equilibrium trade off or fair process-will lead to the creation of more
139
wealth.
Thus, even if the drafters had known about the allocative efficiency paradigm, there is no way to know whether they would have
adopted it. Populists therefore conclude that the only appropriate course is
to base the substantive content of antitrust law upon the purely normative
judgment attributable to Congress, namely, to protect the competitive
140
process.
Unlike Chicagoans, then, who adopt a normative approach
137. See Eleanor Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CAL. L. REV. 917, 918 (1987)
("Each alliance asserts that its approach helps consumers. Each can make a reasonably good case
that its approach to economics advances the cause of consumers."); Fox, supra note 46.
I do not claim that protection of the process is the only means or the obviously superior
route to greatest efficiency or happiest consumers. None of the perspectives on antitrust and efficiency can fairly present itself as the one right answer, in terms of greatest
efficiency alone. All of the perspectives rely on assumptions and even articles of faith.
ld. at 1175.
138. See Flynn, supra note 46, at 721 ("The legal process is constantly confronted with reconciling competing and conflicting moral values underlying its rules in light of the specific realities of individual disputes, role definitions, and consequences of the decision."); cf. BoRK, supra
note 20, at 110-12 (arguing that such trade offs are not legitimate fodder for the judiciary).
139. See Fox, supra note 137, at 918 ("Indeed, in most of the interesting cases, economics is
indeterminate. The real battle is not about where economics leads. Rather, it is about fundamentally different views concerning Ia~ and society."); Fox & Sullivan, supra note 14, at 958
("Economic experts have intense debates as to what scheme is likely to produce a more efficient
or dynamic economy. Economics does not provide a conclusive answer."); see also Jacobs, supra
note 5, at 259-65.
140. See, e.g., Curran, supra note 50, at 361-65; Flynn, supra note 46, at 719-23; Lawrence
A. Sullivan, The Viability of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints, 75 CAL. L. REV. 835, 841
(1987) (noting that "most antitrust issues, in short, are political in nature; these are not matters
on which consensus can be achieved by turning them over to technocrats'); see also Jacobs, supra
note 5, passim. One scholar has argued that the prevalence of state and federal common and
statutory law regulating the dealer-supplier relationship mandates the rejection of what she terms
"the economic efficiency approach" to antitrust law, at least in the context of vertical restraints.
See Burns, supra note 22, at 617-30. As Professor Burns herself notes, however, these statutes
and common law doctrines generally do not prevent suppliers from enforcing, even through termination, explicit contractual terms. See id. at 627-29. The prevalence of such regulation, then,
tells us nothing about current public attitudes concerning distributional restraints as such and, if
anything, seems to evince public acceptance of vertical restraints that are the result of bargaining
between the parties. Cf. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 371 (1967)
(describing the factual finding that distributors were "instructed to sell ... only in their respective territories which were specifically described and allocated on an exclusive basis").
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derived from positive economics, Populists lay claim to an approach that
142
ultimately rests upon law-a policy judgment made by Congress.
2.

What Is Fairness?

What is a fair and open competitive process? To Populists, the answer
is straightforward, at least where distribution is concerned: A fair and open
competitive process is one in which dealers are free to compete by exercising their independent business judgment, unconstrained by restrictions on
143
prices, sales strategies, and the identity of customers.
Resale price maintenance schemes and exclusive territories each infringe upon the ability of
144
traders freely to operate in the market.
To adhere to the congressional
intent to maintain a healthy competitive process, Populists assert that
courts must declare such practices unlawful, even when, as in the case of
141. See Bums, supra note 22, passim (assuming that the modem approach to vertical
restraints depends upon a view that economic efficiency is the sole goal of antitrust); Flynn,
Vertical Restraints, supra note 50, at 1118-19, 1126-27; Hughes, supra note 44, at 275-76
(asserting that the Chicago approach to.vertical restraints depends upon an allocative efficiency
approach to antitrust).
1
142. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 46, at 714-23; Eleanor M. Fox, The Future of the Per Se
Rule: Two Visions at War with One Another, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 200,206-10 (1990) (contrasting
Chicago's purported reliance upon a "minimalist model as scientific truth" and "microeconomics," with the Populists' reliance upon "law").
143. See Petitioners' Brief at 38-39, Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977) (No. 76-15).
Independent small businessmen who have made an investment of capital, energy and
hope in their own enterprises, ought to be able to make their own crucial decisions as to
where to sell and what price to charge for their own merchandise, free of coercion, collusion or exclusionary practices. That is what the free enterprise system, which the
Sherman Act protects, is basically about.
ld. at 38-39; see also THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE BoTILENECKS OF BUSINESS 10-19 (1940);
KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 7, at 17; ROSS, supra note 14.
Today, a Madison ian objection to giving manufacturers discretionary power to fix the
kind and level of local retail competition for their products, combined with traditional
concerns about maintaining the independent freedom of entrepreneurs, has led advocates of non-economic antitrust goals to oppose most vertical restraints.
ld. at 227-28;. see also LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 376 (1977); William). Curran lll,
Antitrust and the Rule of Reason, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 745, 760-66 (1984); Flynn, Vertical
Restraints, supra note 50, at 1102 n.33 ("A dealer's freedom to compete on the merits would be
an example of an antitrust goal unrelated to ourput reduction."); id. at 1138-44; Fox, supra note
46, at 1146-55; see also Jean Wegman Bums, The New Role of Coercion in Antitrust, 60 FORDHAM
L. REV. 379, 385-93 (1991); William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust,
44 EMORY L.J. 1, 29-35 (1995) (describing the role of coercion in the Populist account of
vertical restraints).
144. See, e.g., Petitioners' Brief at 39-40, Continental T.V. (No. 76-15); Bums, supra note
22, at 611-13; Fox, supra note 46, at 1151-52; J.R. Gould & B.S. Yamey,Professor Bork on Vertical
Price Fixing, 76 YALEL.). 722,726 (1967) ("[R).p.m.restrictsthefreedomofdecisionofresellers:').
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maximum resale price maintenance, the practice results in lower prices to
145
consumers.
Traditionally, the Supreme Court took just such an approach to verti146
cal restraints. ln Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., for instance,
the Court declared an agreement establishing minimum resale prices
unlawful because, inter alia, "the public have an interest in every person's
147
carrying on his trade freely [and] so has the individual."
Similarly, in
148
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagmms & Sons, Inc. the Court extended
the per se rule to maximum resale price maintenance because such agreements "cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to
149
sell in accordance with their own judgment." These are just two of sev150
eral decisions taking this approach.
lf this were all there were, the Populist approach and the judicial
decisions consistent with it would collapse under their own weight. After
all, any contract infringes upon a trader's freedom, if Populists define
151
"freedom" as the ability to sell absent contractuallimitations. As Justice
Brandeis put it, "Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of
145.
See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 143, at 376-91; Bums, supra note 22, at 651
(concluding, based in part on concerns for fair treatment of dealers, that "the per se rule for verti·
cal pricing restraints should be retained"); Fox, supra note 46, at 1176-90 ("The per se rule
against vertical price fixing reflects the value that sellers of goods should have the freedom to
charge the price they see fit."). It should be noted that not all scholars who believe that the
Sherman Act incorporates certain noneconomic values agree that maximum resale price main·
tenance should be per se illegal. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 14, at 253-55 (suggesting that the
Supreme Court overrule Albrecht).
146.
220U.S.373(1911).
147. Id. at 406; see also id. ("All interference with individual liberty of action in trading ... [is) contrary to public policy, and therefore void.").
148. 340U.S. 211 (1951).
149. Id. at 213.
150. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968) (holding maximum resale
price maintenance to be per se unreasonable because it "cripple[s) the freedom of traders");
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966) ("This [restraint) obviously
conflicts with the central policy of both § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act
against contracts which take away the freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market.");
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
If the "consignment" agreement achieves [minimum) resale price maintenance in viola·
tion of the Sherman Act, it and the lease are being used to injure interstate commerce
by depriving dealers of the exercise of free judgment whether to become consignees at
all, or remain consignees, and, in any event, to sell at competitive prices.
ld. at 16. See generaU:y Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 67-69
(White,)., concurring) (arguing that the law of vertical restraints has historically implemented
such noneconomic values as dealer autonomy).
See Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 53 n.2l.
151.
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trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence." Take, for
example, an agreement that a coal mine will sell to a public utility its
requirements for a twenty-year period at a fixed price, even if a better offer
153
should come along.
Such an agreement assuredly impinges on the freedom of the coal company to sell to whomever it pleases and at whatever
price it deems appropriate. Or, consider an agreement by a supplier to provide its dealers with a certain share of its output for five years. To hold
that such contracts are presumptively void would relegate all trading to the
154
spot market, substantially hindering commerce.
The Sherman Act cannot be interpreted so as to "disintegrate society so far as it could into indi155
vidual atoms."
Of course, no Populist has suggested that the Sherman Act be interpreted so literally as to outlaw all contracts that have some restraining
156
effect upon a firm's freedom of action. The challenge for Populists, then,
is to distinguish in a meaningful way between a coal company's output contract, on the one hand, and exclusive territories and resale price maintenance, on the other. That is, there must be something else, aside from the
presence of a contractual restraint on "trader freedom," that leads Populists
presumptively to condemn this second class of arrangements. That something else, it seems, is the process by which these restraints on freedom
arise. Whereas the coal contract described above is the result of bargaining
between two relatively equal parties, dealer restraints, Populists claim, are
157
"imposed" upon distributors through superior "bargaining power."
They
152. Chicago &1. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1917); see also Bork, supra
note 32, at 963 ("I am at a loss to know why ... it [is) significant that r.p.m. involves control by
one firm of one of the activities of another. So does every contract or working arrangement
between two firms.").
153.
See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); see also Missouri
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. App. 1979) (enforcing a long-term,
fixed-price coal contract despite a drastic rise in the price of coal on the spot market).
154. See Easterbrook, Ratchet in Antitrust Law, supra note 37, at 715 (observing that the so·
called "inhospitality tradition of antitrust" once regarded competition in the spot market as the
ideal).
155.
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 411 (1904) (Holmes,)., dissent·
ing); see also Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Easterbrook,).) ("The war of all against all is not a good model for any economy. Antitrust law
is designed to ensure an appropriate blend of cooperation and competition, not to require all
economic actors to compete full tilt at every moment.").
156. See Rudolph). Peritz, The "Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Restraint
of Competition, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 285, 340 ( 1989) (observing that even literalists do not take the
Sherman Act-which purports to outlaw all contracts that restrain trade-literally); see also
United States v. )oint-Traffic Assoc., 171 U.S. 505, 566-68 (1898).
·
157.
See Bums, supra note 22, at 603 n.32; Flynn, Vertical Restraints, supra note 50, at 113744; see also Hughes, supra note 44, at 298 ("If these [vertical) restrictions are uniformly applied
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are thus inherently coercive and inconsistent with the congressional policy
expressed in the act.
One can draw an analogy to the general law of contracts and, more
158
precisely, the rules governing contractual unconscionability.
Mere sub,
stantive unfairness of a contractual term, without more, does not generally
render that term unconscionable. Such substantive unconscionability must
be accompanied by procedural unconscionability, some defect in the bar,
gaining process, such as unequal bargaining power, before a term will be
159
deemed unconscionable and thus unenforceable.
Similarly, Populists do
not condemn vertical restraints simply because they restrain a dealer's freedom of action after the contract has been signed. Instead, they object to
the restraint because it has been foisted upon an unwillfng distributorbecause unequal bargaining power distorts the negotiating process that pro160
duces such contracts. This, of course, is parallel to the Populist approach
to tying contracts: voluntary ties are deemed benign, even though they
foreclose from the market some sellers of the tied product, whereas those
161
"forced" through market power are presumed illegal.
and freely agreed to, there is no unfairness because the firm's autonomy has not been infringed.
They are unfair, however, when they are unilaterally imposed through the exercise of superior
bargaining power or opportunistic behavior after the relationship [begins).").
158.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 207 (1982); U.C.C. § 2-302 (1995).
159.
See Communications Maintenance, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 761 F.2d 1202, 1209 (7th
Cir. 1984) (noting that both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present
before court will void contractual term) (applying Indiana law); Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("Unconscionability has generally been rec·
ognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together
with.contract[ual) terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party."); Guthman v. La
Vida Llena, 103 N.M. 506 (1985); Wade v. Austin, 524 S.W.2d 79, 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975);
see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (2d ed. 1990); Arthur Allen Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 488 (1967)
(drawing a distinction between procedural and substantive unconscionability).
160.
See Bums, supra note 22, at 603 (vertical restraints are forced on dealers); Curran,
supra note 50, at 363; Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note 58, at 1132 ("[The Chicago) argument, how·
ever, is merely an apology for enforcing the paternalism ... of [the) restraint."); Flynn, Antitrust
Enforcement, supra note 50 ..
[V)ertical restraints are an expression of [manufacturer) power, not an expression of a
competitive process at work. In such circumstances, the market is not one governed by
consumer sovereignty, but instead is a market managed by powerful firms operating in
concentrated industries or is a market distorted by an imbalance of bargaining power.
ld. at 293; see also Petitioners' Brief at 39, Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977) (No. 76-15) (arguing that the failure to outlaw exclusive territories will leave
manufacturers with the ability to "throttle" dealers); Ross, supra note 14, at 227 (referring to the
discretionary power of manufacturers to fix the kind and level of retail competition).
See Meese, supra note 7; see also, e.g., Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying
161.
Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50 (1958).
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The analogy between unconscionability doctrine and the Populist
approach to vertical restraints is not perfect, however. Courts applying
unconscionability doctrine scrutinize carefully whether the seller actually
162
possesses unequal bargaining power. Populists, on the other hand, appar~
ently presume, without case~by~case inquiry, that contracts between
manufacturers and dealers are the product of a bargaining process infected
by superior bargaining power brought to bear by the manufacturer. Popu~
lists believe that tying contracts are necessarily "forced" on purchasers
163
through the exercise of market power.
Similarly, they have apparently
adopted a presumption to the effect that, when a manufacturer possesses
market power due to product differentiation, that power is employed to
"impose" vertical restraints on unwilling distributors through superior bar~
gaining power, thus distorting the competitive process by obtaining agree~
164
ment to terms that would not arise in a truly free market.
Populists
162. These courts generally ask whether the buyer had a meaningful choice to enter the
contract in question. See, e.g., Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d at 449; FARNSWORTH,
supra note 159, at 506--10 & n.49 (detailing the standards courts employ in determining whether
a contractual term is the result of unequal bargaining power).
163.
See Meese, supra note 7.
164. This assumption is explicitly or implicitly contained in Populist statements about the
connection between market power and the negotiation of vertical restraints. One scholar, for
instance, states that the mere existence of a restraint establishes that a manufacturer is exercising
such power. See Ponsoldt, supra note 52, at 1170. Another asserts that the Chicago approach
improperly assumes that "in the real world parties of equal power in a perfectly competitive market freely bargain." Flynn, Vertical Restraints, supra note 50, at 1137. The negative implication,
of course, is that such restraints are not freely bargained when the market departs from perfect
competition. See id. at 1144 (analogizing vertical restraints to "some form of government regu·
lation requir[ing) coercive or collective action to affect pricing"); id. at 1141 (arguing that the
Chicago approach "provides for the enforcement of the property and contract rights of the
restraint's proponent, without regard for the rights of others entangled [in) the restraint").
Another scholar asserts that such contracts are generally not agreements at all, due to such
coercion. See Bums, supra note 22, at 603 n.32 (asserting that "[t)he vertical agreement gener·
ally is, thus, a conceptual oddity: it is an agreement that is often forced on one party, usually the
dealer"); see also Ross, supra note 14, at 227 (noting concern that suppliers use discretionary
power to fix terms of retail competition); Curran, supra. note 50, at 362; Flynn, Antitrust
Enforcement, supra note 50, at 293; Gould & Yamey, supra note 144.
[Bork) refers to vertical price fixing "agreements." It is unrealistic to use such language
in relation to r.p.m.; the notion that the "parties" indulge in such deliberation[s] [over
whether or not to adopt r.p.m.) is particularly fanciful. ... Where the manufacturer is a
monopolist, or where all or [al)most [all) competing brands are price-maintained, a
reseller must "agree," whatever he might think of the restraint imposed upon him.
ld. at 726--27; see also White, supra note 25, at 9-10 (stating that manufacturers impose vertical
restraints); id. at 12 (characterizing vertical restraints as a manufacturer regulation of dealer
activities). This assumption continues to influence the private bar as well. See Brief of the
Service Station Dealers of America at 8, State Oil Co. v. Khan, 117 S. Ct. 941 (1997) (No. 96871) (asserting that "a supplier can effectively impose a maximum price only if it has power over
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therefore conclude that enforcement of such agreements constitutes a pref165
erence for the "freedom" of suppliers over that of dealers. This approach
is not limited to the antitrust context; it flows naturally from the assumption, associated with legal realism, that contracts between large companies
and consumers or distributors are necessarily the result of the larger firms'
166
superior bargaining power. Thus, whenever the market departs from perfect competition, such coercion ought to be presumed. According to the
its dealers") (citing Warren Grimes, When Do Franchisors Have Market Power? Antitrust Remedies
for Franchisor Opportunism, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 152 (1996)).
165.
See Bums, supra note 22, at 611 (characterizing the question in Continental T.V. as
one of "whose marketing freedom should triumph"); see also Lawrence Sullivan, Brief of the
Small Business Legal Defense Committee as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 22,
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914) (likening resale
price maintenance to centralized price setting by the government); Petitioners' Brief at 58,
Continental T.V. (No. 76-15) (arguing that the failure to outlaw exclusive territories constitutes
a preference for the seller's "administered judgment about the ideal deployment of outlets across
the nation" and is a "display of paternalistic overreaching"); Bums, supra note 22, at 613 (noting
that, under current law, "the supplier's marketing decisions triumph over the dealer's"); Flynn,
Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 50, at 292 (asserting that the Chicago approach consists of
"paternalism assuming that seller rationality is a sufficient surrogate for the collective rationality
of all decisionmakers in the markerplace"); Gould & Yamey, supra note 144, at 942-43; Peritz,
supra note 25, at 547 (asserting that current law "enlarges the manufacturer's liberty of contract
right to restrain competition, for the explicit purpo~e of limiting dealer liberty to set prices for its
products"). As shown below, however, these scholars have posited a false conflict between
dealer and manufacturer freedom. Far from impinging on "dealer freedom," the enforcement of
vertical restraints might actually enhance it. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
166.
See, e.g., THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 251-52 (1935)
(asserting that the American system of distribution is a "great industrial feudalism"); WALTER H.
HAMILTON, THE PATTERN OF COMPETITION (1940).
If a large number of companies had survived, dealer and manufacturer might have
enjoyed equal power to shape the terms of this bargain. But at first the manufacturer
needed funds to carry on; so he required of the dealer a payment in advance and
demanded the remainder in cash on the delivery .... As companies became fewer and
makes of cars came to be nationally known, an inequality in bargaining power developed.
ld. at 29; see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV.
741, 754 (1982) ("The development and application of specific unconscionability norms is
closely [limited) to the manner in which the relevant market deviates from a perfectly competi·
tive market."); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
With the decline of the free enterprise system due to the innate trend of competitive
capitalism towards monopoly, the meaning of contract has changed radically.... Freedom of contract enables enterprisers to legislate ... in a substantially
authoritarian manner without using the appearance of authoritarian forms. Standard
contracts in particular could thus become effective instruments in the hands of powerful
industrial and commercial overlords enabling them to impose a new feudal order of
their own making upon a vast host of vassals.
ld. at 640; see also Page, supra note 143, at 29-35 (describing the link between Realism and
Populist approaches to antitrust).
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Populists, this coercion is inconsistent with the Chicago view of the origins
. 167
and purposes of sueh restramts.
The assumption that vertical restraints are imposed on· dealers
through bargaining power is not limited to Populist academics. lt also
formed the basis for those Supreme Court decisions articulating the traditional approach to these agreements. Consider Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
68
International Parts Corp! There, several franchisees of Midas Mufflers,
Inc., challenged various vertical restrictions contained in their franchise
agreements, including clauses granting exclusive territories and empower69
ing Midas to set resale prices!
Midas argued that the common law
defense of in pari delicto ("in equal fault") barred the suit because the franchisees had participated in the scheme, had full knowledge of the offending
provisions when they signed the agreements, and, indeed, had enthusi170
astically sought additional franchises subject to the same contracts:
The Court, per Justice Black, held that the defense of in pari delicto
was not available because the franchisees had no choice but to accept the
terms in question in order to obtain the franchises, with the result that
171
"their participation was not voluntary in any meaningful sense."
This
holding was not premised upon a finding of actual coercion, or a finding
that Midas possessed power in any properly defined market. Instead, the
holding apparently adopted an irrefutable presumption that all such
restrictions are "coerced" through an exercise of market power. No
attempt was made to analyze the structure of the market or to determine
whether any market power had actually been employed to induce accep172
tance of the restraints in question.
Similar assumptions are to be found
167. See Flynn, Vertical Restraints, supra note 50, at 1137 (arguing that the Chicago
approach assumes "that in the real world parties [with) equal power in a perfectly competitive
market freely bargain"); White, supra note 25, at 38 ("The Chicago School asserts that, because
manufacturers are driven by competitive forces, the vertical restraints they impose must be in
response to those forces and, therefore, necessarily are procompetitive as well as economically
efficient.").
168. 392
134 (1968).
169. See id. at 136--37.
170. See id. at 137-38 (recounting defendant's argument); see also Perma Life Mufflers, Inc.
v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692, 699 (7th Cir. 1967).
171. Penna Ufe Mufflers, 392 U.S. at 139; see also id. at 145 (White, J., concurring) ("When
those with market power and leverage persuade, coerce, or influence others to cooperate in an
illegal combination to their damage, allowing recovery to the latter is wholly consistent with the
purposes of § 4, since it will deter those most likely to be responsible for organizing illegal
schemes.").
172. Cf. Eisenberg,supra note 166, at 753; Flynn,AntitrustEnforcemen~ supra note 50, at 293.
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in other decisions applying the traditional approach to vertical restraints,
173
as well as in other areas of the Court's antitrust jurisprudence.
3.

Exposing Populism's Price Theory

The preceding analysis should make clear that the Populist approach
to vertical restraints does not rest upon purely normative premises that are
174
Whether expressed academically or
divorced from economic theory.
judicially, the Populist approach begins with the normative premise that
"coercion" of dealers should be condemned--coercion that Populists define
as the exercise of market power to induce acceptance of an unwanted contractual term. Thus, far from resting their approach upon purely legal
premises, Populists have imbued a price-theoretic concept, the exercise of
175
market power, with normative significance.
Moreover, the Populist reliance upon price theory does not end with
the normative; its descriptive approach also depends critically upon a pricetheoretic approach to interpreting the origin of vertical restraints. More
precisely, the Populist approach rests upon the assumption, often adopted
by price theorists, that when a manufacturer possesses market power due to
product differentiation, any contract ancillary to the sale of that product to
173.
See Alhrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149-52 (1968) (holding that resale price
maintenance forces the judgment ofthe seller upon the dealer); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377
U.S. 13, 21 (1964) ("By reason of the lease and 'consignment' agreement dealers are coercively
laced into an arrangement under which their supplier is able to impose non-competitive prices
on thousands of persons whose prices otherwise might be competitive."); id. at 31-32 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (objecting to the Court's assumption, without a trial, that the contract at issue was
coercive); Peritz, supra note 25, at 538-41 (arguing that Albrecht and Simpson are based on the
desire "to redistribute bargaining power between large producers and small distributors"); see also
jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (noting that the presence of mar·
ket power, without more, gives rise to a conclusive presumption that a tying contract has been
forced on a purchaser through an exercise of market power); Fortner Enters. Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 504 (1969) (observing that the mere existence of a tie gives rise to a
presumption that it has been forced on the purchaser). Indeed, the notion that vertical restraints
are coerced seems implicit in the Supreme Court's equation of "agreement" with "coercion" in
those instances in which there is no written contract. See, e.g., Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 150 n.6;
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 ( 1960).
174.
See supra notes 125-142 and accompanying text (documenting Populists' claims to a
purely normative approach).
175.
Populists could respond that it is Congress, and not they, who have imbued the exer·
cise of market power with normative significance. However, just as the Congress of 1890 could
not have understood the price-theoretic concept of allocative efficiency, so too could it not have
understood the price-theoretic concept of the exercise of market power. See supra notes 126-128
and accompanying text (recounting the Populist argument that the Congress of 1890 could not
have understood the price-theoretic allocative efficiency paradigm).
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a dealer is a manifestation of that power.
Absent such power, Populists
177
assume, no such restraint on freedom would have been negotiated.
It is not surprising that Populists have failed to recognize the dependence of their approach, as well as the approach traditionally taken by the
Supreme Court, upon normative and descriptive premises derived from
price theory. After all, for many decades, the view that contracts between
manufacturers and distributors were not "freely bargained" was widely held
178
among judges, lawyers, and economists.
Assumptions so broadly shared
179
are often not recognized as assumptions at all.
Of course, not all mere
assumptions are wrong, or even presumptively invalid. In this case, however, the NIE, along with the Chicago approach, undermines the
descriptive assumption that drives Populist hostility toward such restraints.
Moreover, by undermining this assumption, the NIE requires the conclusion that, even if courts accept Populist normative premises, they should
180
still presume that vertical restraints are lawful.
B.

Debunking the Presumption of Coercion

The mere fact that Populists rely upon price theory to inform their
normative premises does not, ipso facto, call into question their approach to
176.
See Coase, supra note 104, at 67-68 (describing the propensity of price theorists to
ascribe monopolistic origins to nonstandard contracts); Easterbrook, Ratchet in Antitrnst Law,
supra note 37, at 715 (noting that, at one time, "many practices were genuine mysteries to
economists, and monopolistic explanations ... were congenial"); Langlois, supra note 105, at
835; Williamson, supra note 109, at 295 ('"Applied price theory' was used in the 1960s to ascribe
monopoly purpose[s) to many beneficial nonstandard practices."); see also Friedrich Kessler &
Richard Stem, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1959)
("Bargaining power is a crucial consideration in [vertical) contract integration.").
See supra notes 163-166 and accompanying text.
177.
178. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139
(1968); Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello,
63 N.J. 402 (1973); HAMILTON, supra note 166, at 29; William B. Bohling, Franchise Terminations Under the Sherman Act: Populism and Relational Power, 53 TEx. L. REV. 1180, 1203-06
(1975); Gould & Yamey, supra note 144, at 726-27; Kessler, supra note 166, at 640; Kessler &
Stem, supra note 176, at 7-8; see also Bums, supra note 22, at 620 (arguing that the recent trend
toward regulation of the franchise relationship reflects "a view of the franchisee as being in an
unequal bargaining position vis-a-vis the franchisor").
179. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelit-y and Theory, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 395, 441 (1995) ("As an institution, a court cannot resist 'reality' as it appears to all-or
what is the same thing, a court cannot resist the facts of an uncontested discourse. Fidelity is
pursued by courts subject to the constraints of an uncontested discourse.").
180. Cf. Flynn, AntitTU.st Enforcement, supra note 50, at 293 (asserting that the result in
Continental T.V. is premised upon existence of perfectly competitive markets); Flynn, Vertical
Restraints, supra note 50, at 1137 (arguing that the Chicago approach assumes the presence of
free bargaining in a perfectly competitive market).
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vertical restraints. However, Populists have gone one step further by
adopting a purely descriptive, economic assumption about the link between
market power, on the one hand, and the presence of such restraints, on the
other. More precisely, the Populist approach to vertical restraints depends
upon a presumption that manufacturers impose such restraints on dealers
through a coercive exercise of market power, even if the restraint attenuates free riding by distributors. As shown below, this assumption is inconsistent with the model of contract formation associated with the NIE.
Manufacturers face a choice: distribute products themselves, or rely
181
upon the market--dealers-to do so for them. Price theory and the lawyers who rely upon it predict that this choice will be governed only by
static cost considerations, i.e., that manufacturers will rely upon dealers
whenever they can distribute the product more cheaply than the manufacturer.182 In the real world, however, such reliance on the market comes
with a price unrelated to static costs: market failure. As described earlier,
the promotion and servicing of a differentiated product is a collective good,
183
Simply selling
the production of which is characterized by free riding.
products to dealers and leaving them to determine, according to their
independent judgment, how, where, and at what price to resell, will result
184
in an underinvestment in promotion and service.
Such underinvestment, a form of market failure, will lead to reduced demand for the
185
manuf acturer's product.
From the perspective of the manufacturer, this anticipated underinvestment represents a cost of relying upon the market to distribute its
186
products. The manufacturer can avoid this cost through complete verti181. See Coase, supra note 96, passim.
182. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 15-42, 365-84; see also DoNALD DEWEY,
MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 201-02 (1959); Stigler, supra note 106, at 185, 187;
Williamson, supra note 109, at 272 (noting that neoclassical theory recognizes two possible justi·
fications for unfamiliar conduct: "monopolizing" and "economizing"). For a classic application of
the price-theoretic assumption that the only benign purpose of vertical integration is the reduction of production costs, see Kessler & Stem, supra note 176, at 2-3. indeed, even Robert Bork
once succumbed to this limited view of the benefits of vertical integration. See Robert Bork,
Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 200 (1954) (describing the
benefits of vertical integration as "bypass[ing) a monopoly at one level, or ... enabling the
achievement of internal efficiencies").
183. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
184. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 186-87; Goldberg, supra note 97, at 107-08;
Posner, supra note 71, at 283-85; Telser, supra note 68, at 91-93; Williamson, supra note 97,
at 958.
185. See Telser, supra note 68, at 92-93.
186. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 187-89.

186

45 UCLA LAW REVIEW 143 (1997)
187

cal integration, taking upon itself the task of distribution. Such complete
integration, however, comes with costs of its own. As a result, the choice
between complete reliance on the market and complete integration is not a
188
happyone.
Minimum resale price maintenance and exclusive territories are
examples of partial integration-a middle ground between these two
189
unhappy choices. By selling its product subject to an exclusive territory,
for instance, a manufacturer can attenuate the market failure that would
otherwise result from its reliance upon dealers to distribute its product.
While Chicagoans have long employed this characterization of these contracts, they have failed to recognize its full implications for the Populist
190
approach.
Indeed, some Chicagoans seem perfectly willing to concede
191
that, despite their benefits, such restraints are "imposed" coercively.
As
shown below, however, no such concession is necessary. If such a restraint
does, in fact, reduce free riding and enhance demand for the seller's product, there will be no need for a manufacturer to use bargaining power to
"impose" it. Instead, the manufacturer could obtain agreement to such a
192
clause through a process of purely voluntary negotiation.
187. See Saul Levmore, Rescuing Some Antitrust Law: An Essay on Vertical Restrictions and
Consumer Information, 67IOWA L. REV. 981,983 (1982).
188. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 187-89; Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, The
Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691,
716 (1986) ("[Complete) integration shifts the incentives for opportunistic and distortionary
behavior, but it does not remove those incentives."); Levmore, supra note 187, at 983.
189. See Baxter, supra note 20, at 948 (characterizing vertical restraints as a middle ground
between complete reliance upon the market and complete integration); Coase, supra note 110, at
19, 27; Coase, supra note 96, at 388 n.9, 392 n.l; see also Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual
Nature of the Finn, 26j.L. &ECON. 1 (1983).
The polar cases [between the firm and the market) are complicated by middlemen and
subcontractors; agents contract among themselves; and any type of input may support a
variety of contractual arrangements. We surmise that these very complications, which
render the firm ambiguous, have arisen from attempts to save transaction costs that
were not avoidable in the polar cases.
Id. at 19; see also Klein et al., supra note 110, at 326 ("[The) primary distinction between trans·
actions made within a firm and transactions made in the marketplace may be too simplistic.
Many long term relationships ... blur the distinction between the market and the firm.").
190. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 20, at 948 (characterizing vertical restraints as a partial
contractual integration); Bork, supra note 32, at 963 (same).
191. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 145-65 (referring repeatedly to the imposition of vertical
restrictions by manufacturers); Robert H. Bork, A Reply to Professors Gould and Yamey, 76 YALE
L.J. 731, 739 ( 1967) ("This argument [in favor of resale price maintenance) rests upon the idea of
consumer sovereignty. It does not depend in any way upon a notion that the resellers may be
said to have 'agreed' to r.p.m.").
192. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 180-82 (arguing that franchisors obtain agreement
to various vertical restraints without imposing them through market power); Louis Kaplow,
Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 546 n.125 (1985)
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The process of voluntary negotiation that leads to agreement to such
restraints can be easily explained. Where a contractual term limiting a
dealer's discretion can attenuate anticipated market failure, failure to
include such a provision in the contract, ancillary to the sale of product in
question, imposes a cost on the manufacturer in the form of lost future
sales. This cost will be reflected in the price of the product as sold to the
193
Inclusion of such a clause, on the other hand, eliminates this
dealer.
cost, allowing the manufacturer to offer the product to the dealer at a
. 194
reduced pnce.
In bargaining over the sale of its product, then, the manufacturer will
offer different "packages" of contractual terms, each at a price reflecting the
195
benefits or the costs of the respective packages to the manufacturer.
More precisely, the manufacturer will off~r the dealer a choice between two
different contracts ancillary to the opportunity to distribute its products,
each priced to reflect the harms to the manufacturer resulting from the
196
presence vel non of a restraint that attenuates market failure.
One,
higher-priced contract will contain no provision mitigating market failure;
a second, lower-priced contract will contain a provision, such as an
197
exclusive territory or the like, that does limit such behavior.
The
resulting price differential will induce the distributor to internalize the
prospective costs of market failure and, other things being equal, to agree
to the provision limiting its ability to free ride on the provision of
• J:
•
. by oth ers. 198
mrormatton
and servtces
(recognizing that procompetitive tying contracts need not be imposed through market power);

see also Coase, supra note 189, at 26-27 (noting that explanations of vertical integration as
reducing transaction costs do not depend on the existence of or attempt to achieve a monopoly);
Coase, supra note 96, at 394 (asking what, "apart from monopoly," determines the boundary
between the firm and the market).
Cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991) (asserting that
193.
cost savings from a forum selection clause would be passed on to consumers); Northwestern Nat'!
Life Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (reasoning that sellers
will pass along cost savings resulting from a change in contractual provisions).
194.
It makes no difference, of course, whether the manufacturer possesses market powerthat is, the manufacturer is able to set its price at some level above cost. See infra note 203.
When the presence or absence of a restraint changes the costs faced by the manufacturer, price
will change accordingly.
195.
See WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 32-35.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198.
See Meese, supra note 98, at 133-34 (describing a similar process whereby the manufacturer obtains agreement to the franchise tying contract). It should be noted that this process
does not depend upon the dealer's possession of perfect information about the costs of opportunism. Instead, the dealer need only know the extent of the price differential, not the reason for it.
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A similar process of contract formation can lead to the voluntary
adoption of maximum resale price maintenance. By pricing above advertised prices, dealers can dilute the goodwill associated with the manufac199
turer's product to the detriment of the manufacturer and other dealers.
As a result, manufacturers will be compelled to adopt less desirable forms of
promotion, and sales will suffer. The sale of a product without an agreement that prevents price gouging, then, will involve a higher cost to the
manufacturer than a sale with such an agreement, and the resulting price
differential can induce acceptance of it.
At one level, the price differentials that lead dealers to agree to vertical restraints are indistinguishable from an exercise of market power to
200
"coerce" acceptance of an "unwanted" contractual term.
Such an exercise of power, as defined by price theory, also consists of a price differential:
a monopoly price accompanying a contract without an unwanted term, and
. h ow. accompanymg
. a contract wtt
. h sueh a term. 201 There ts,
a lower pnce
ever, one crucial difference between the two differentials: the differential
described by the NIE is justified by the costs associated with the respective
202
The
packages, whereas the differential described by price theory is not.
former, then, cannot be characterized as an exercise of market power,
203
which, after all, price theory defines as the ability to price above cost.
Thus, even if a manufacturer possesses market power, there is no reason to presume that restraints ancillary to the sale of the product in ques204
tion have been coerced through an exercise of that power.
Instead, the
process of contract formation that leads to the adoption of such restraints is
indistinguishable from the process, for instance, that induces a public util205
ity and a coal mine to adopt a requirements contract, the process through
Cf. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 525-28 (1945)
(describing how prices convey complex information).
199.
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
200. Cf. Meese, supra note 7.
201. See Fortner Enters. Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1969)
(describing how a firm with market power can use price differentials to induce acceptance of a
tying contract); Kaplow, supra note 192, at 526-27; see also Meese, supra note 7.
202. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 23-29; Meese, supra note 7; Meese, supra note 98,
at 133 n.103.
203. See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 7, at 8-9, 64-65; William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981) (defining market power as
the ability to price above cost); A.P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of
Monopoly Power, 1 REV. ECON. STUD. 157 (1933); Meese, supra note 7; Meese, supra note 98, at
133 n.103.
204. Cf. supra notes 163-166 and accompanying text (recounting the Populist assertion
that vertical restraints flow from an exercise of market power).
205. See supra note 153 (citing cases involving such contracts).
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which two parties determine who will bear the risk of a product defect, or
the process through which a failing firm convinces its distributors to agree
207
to a vertical restraint.
No market power is necessary to the negotiation
of any of these provisions, for which firms would bargain even absent any
208
power; the presence of such power is simply coincidental.
Indeed, to the extent that market power flows from the existence of
product differentiation, the presence of such differentiation suggests that
minimum RPM and exclusive territories, for instance, are vehicles for
reducing transaction costs, and thus are the result of the kind of contractual negotiation process described above, a process unrelated to the
2
exercise of that power. r» This process involves no abridgment of "trader
freedom" as defined by the Populists. Rather, it furthers that freedom by
allowing the parties to cooperate in a way that maximizes the gains from
210
The descriptive economic presumption underlying
their relationship.
Populist prescriptions, then, appears to be flawed. Even if one accepts the
Populist normative approach, namely, that "coercion" in the form of an
exercise of market power should be condemned, vertical distribution
restraints are in no way suspect, regardless whether the manufacturer that
obtains them happens to possess a substantial degree of market power. Zll

C.

Less Restrictive Alternatives

Populists have grudgingly admitted that vertical restraints can, in
some instances, produce procompetitive benefits.m Still, they have main206. See generally George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J.
1297 (1981) (arguing that the content of product warranties is unrelated to market power and
instead determined in a way that minimizes the joint costs associated with product defects and
their prevention).
207. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 374 (1967) (hinting that
the restraint might have been subject to Rule of Reason treatment if Schwinn had been a failing
firm); see also Peritz, supra note 25, at 572-73.
208.
Cf. KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 7, at 8 (asserting that market power confers on
firms the ability to behave differently from the way in which they would behave in the competi·
tive market).
209. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (describing the role that such restraints
play in inducing the provision of information to consumers).
210. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRAcr AS PROMISE 14 (1981) (arguing that the
enforcement of promises enhances individual autonomy by facilitating cooperative efforts); F.A.
HAYEK, THECONSTITUTIONOFLIBERTY 140-41 (1960) (same).
211. Cf. Flynn, Vertical Restraints, supra note 50, at 1099 ("[L]egal analysis should explore
the moral and factual assumptions hidden in premises.").
212. See id. at 1144; Peritz, supra note 25, at 570-73; Mark E. Roszkowski, Vertical
Maximum Price Fixing: In Defense of Albrecht, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 209, 231 (1992) ("Maximum
resale price fixing has a legitimate goal.").
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rained that the possible existence of such benefits is largely irrelevant,
because they could be achieved through means less restrictive than
213
exclusive territories or resale price maintenance.
One scholar, for
instance, suggests that manufacturers can avoid the market failure that
accompanies reliance upon dealers' judgment as to the extent of product
promotion by "restrict[ing] the distribution of their products to buyers
214
whom they are certain will provide point of sale services."
Another
scholar argues that manufacturers can adopt "primary responsibility or passthrough clauses, direct payments to dealers for services, cooperative adver..
.
ttsmg,
warranty compensatton
agreements, an d oth er arrangements. ,215
The apparent implication of these assertions is that the adoption of
minimum resale price maintenance or exclusive territories instead of these
equally-effective alternatives suggests that the true purpose of the manufacturer is not to promote dealer service, and that the manufacturer has
216
coerced the dealer to agree to the more restrictive provision.
Populists have far overstated the relevance of less restrictive alternative analysis in this context, and have done so in a way that only highlights
their reliance upon unrealistic descriptive presumptions concerning the
presence vel non of coercion. It is certainly true that, when a less restrictive
alternative serves a purported objective better than, or as well as, the
restraint under review, one can reasonably infer that the restraint is the
217
product of coercion.
Yet very few, if any, of the less restrictive alternatives identified by the Populists are equally effective as exclusive territories
or resale price maintenance. Indeed, the assertion that less restrictive
alternatives will produce the very same benefits as these restraints rests
213. See, e.g., Petitioners' Brief at 48-49, Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977) (No. 76-15); SULLIVAN, supra note 143, at 386; Flynn, Antitrust Enforcement,
supra note 50, at 292; Flynn, Vertical Restraints, supra note 50, at 1144; Peritz, supra note 25, at
570-73; Roszkowski, supra note 212, at 232-33 (arguing that less restrictive alternatives are
available to serve the ohjectives of maximum price fixing).
214.
Flynn, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 50, at 292; see also Lawrence Sullivan, Brief of
the Small Business Legal Defense Committee as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 26
& n.73, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914).
215.
Sullivan, Amicus Brief at 27, Monsanto (No. 82-914); Peritz, supra note 25, at 571-72
(payment for services); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15-17 (1978).
216. See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 14, at 245 n.SO ("Of course, if a manufacturer can find
effective ways of achieving its marketing goals short of exclusive territories or location clauses,
then Madisonian goals could be accommodated by finding these restraints illegal.").
217.
But see Meese, supra note 98, at 151 n.185.
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upon highly unrealistic assumptions-assumptions usually associated only
with the perfect competition model.
Consider, for instance, the assertion by Professor Lawrence Sullivan
and others that manufacturers can simply contract for the appropriate level
of various pre, and post,sale services, instead of employing exclusive terri,
218
tories or minimum resale price maintenance.
It is theoretically possible
for manufacturers and dealers to negotiate detailed contracts, stipulating
what services dealers will perform, and for what compensation. In the
alternative, the parties could simply negotiate for best efforts provisions or
rely upon the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every con,
219
tract.
Manufacturers would then monitor compliance by dealers with
whom they made such agreements, and refuse to pay for services not ade,
quately performed.
In a world with no bargaining costs, such alternatives would, as Popu,
lists suggest, produce results indistinguishable from an exclusive territory or
minimum resale price maintenance scheme. Indeed, these alternatives may
well be superior to both, allowing individualized, dealer,by,dealer tailoring
of service levels and types. In the real world, however, these alternatives
would entail significant costs over and above those involved in negotiating
220
and enforcing a simple exclusive territory or resale price.
Firms and
dealers either would have to agree on the various types and levels of service
desired, and memorialize that agreement in writing, or rely on courts to
221
interpret best efforts or good faith requirements ex post.
Manufac,
218.
See Sullivan, Amicus Brief at 26 & n.73, Monsanto (No. 82-914); SULLIVAN, supra
note 143, at 386; see also Peritz, supra note 25, at 571; Pitofsky, supra note 215, at 22-23.
See Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 728 (7th Cir. 1979) {interpreting
219.
the implied covenant of good faith in the franchise context); Hentze v. Unverfehrt, 604 N.E.2d
536, 539 (Ill. App. 1992) (same); WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 50-51, 66-67 (arguing that
absent transaction costs, "general clause contracting" will suffice to prevent opportunistic behavior); see also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV.
1089,1111-30 (1981).
220.
See Arquit, supra note 69, at 452 (noting that there are "[d)ifficulties in drafting and
enforcing complex contracts requiring dealers to provide what often can be nebulous services
(such as 'attentiv~ salespeople' or 'attractive shopping environment')"); Baxter, supra note 20, at
948 ("Contracts that deal with all future contingencies cannot practically be written.");
Goldberg, supra note 97, at 107.
221.
See Muris, supra note 90, at 575 ("[F)ranchisees can 'cheat' on quality in ways that are
costly to detect and prove. Moreover, clauses specifying elements of quality will often prove
expensive to draft in complete detail and certainly to enforce in court .... "); see also
WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 46 ("Comprehensive contracting is not a realistic organizational
alternative when provision for bounded rationality is made.").
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turers would have to monitor compliance with such provisions-a difficult
task given the number of attributes of service involved and the wide
222
dispersion of dealers. Once a violation was detected, firms would have to
take some action to enforce compliance. If the violation was detected
before payment for the services, the manufacturer could withhold payment,
perhaps subjecting itself to a breach of contract suit. If, however, the
manufacturer detected the violation after payment had been made, it would
be forced either to file its own breach of contract action, or to engage in
self-help remedies, such as termination. The former remedy, of course,
223
In fact, aside from Popuwould be entirely unavailing in the real world.
224
lists, only neoclassical economists assume otherwise.
The latter remedy,
termination, would be particularly powerful, but only if the parties have, by
contract, arranged their relationship so that termination deprives the
dealer of either investments specific to the relationship or economic
225
Such an arrangement ts
· use
· If a transactiOn
. cost, a cost t h at must
rents.
be incurred because the legal system is an imperfect mechanism for enforc. the contracts m
. quesuon.
. 226
mg
This is not to say that exclusive territories or resale price maintenance
are costless mechanisms for assuaging the sort of market failure that flows
from the manufacturer's reliance upon dealers to distribute its products.
Territories must be defined and prices must be set, and manufacturers must
monitor dealers' compliance with them. Yet, such definition will be less
222.
See Goldberg, supra note 97, at 107 ("Selling effort is not a service easily bought and
sold in impersonal markets .... [T)he quality of the service is difficult to monitor .... ");
Levmore, supra note 187, at 983 & n.7; Muris, supra note 90, at 574.
223.
See Muris, supra note 90, at 574.
224.
See Langlois, supra note 105, at 835 (describing assumptions by price theorists that
markets consist of "homogenous goods traded among anonymous transactors with all the
(possibly contingent) terms explicitly spelled out in advance'); see also WILLIAMSON, supra note 97.
Most studies of exchange assume that efficacious rules of law regarding contract
disputes are in place and are applied by the courts in an informed, sophisticated, and
low-cost way. Those assumptions are convenient, in that lawyers and economists are
relieved of the need to examine the variety of ways by which individual parties to an
exchange "contract out of or away from" the governance structures of the state by
devising private orderings. Thus arises a division of effort whereby economists are
preoccupied with the economic benefits that accrue to specialization and exchange,
while legal specialists focus on the technicalities of contract law.
Id. at 20.
225.
See Klein eta!., supra note 110.
226.
See Patrick J. Kaufmann & Francine LaFontaine, Costs of Control: The Sources of
Economic Rents for McDonald's Franchisees, 37 J.L. & ECON. 417 (1994) (concluding that
McDonald's must leave rents downstream so as to create a possible penalty upon termination);
Klein eta!., supra note 110, at 306-07; Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics
of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 345, 352-53 (1985).
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expensive than the process of defining the levels of various sorts of services
to be provided by dealers. Moreover, it is cheaper to· determine whether a
dealer has sold outside its territory or below a certain price than it is to
ascertain if it has failed to adhere to a complex set of guidelines governing
various attributes of dealer service, if for no other reason than that other
227
dealers will know and complain. Because violations of resale price maintenance agreements or exclusive territories are easier to detect, manufacturers need induce less relationship-specific investment to deter cheating
228
on such agreements.
Failure to adopt a less restrictive alternative, then,
likely suggests a desire to minimize the costs of eliminating the market failure in question.
ln addition, relegating parties to reliance upon payments for individual services will attenuate the benefits of a dealer system of distribution.
Presumably, different classes of dealers face customers with different service
229
needs. A form contract granting each dealer an exclusive territory would
allow for dealer-by-dealer decision making about the appropriate mix of
various presale and postsale services. Under the Populist approach, by contrast, the parties would have to negotiate different contracts for each of
these different classes, each contract providing for a different mix of services to be provided. Such individualized negotiation, of course, would
eliminate the benefits of relying upon dealers' judgment as to the appropriate mix of services to provide and attenuate the benefits associated with
230
the standardization of contracts.
Similar objections can be raised to the assertion by Populists that
manufacturers can choose, at the outset, dealers whom they know will
227.
See WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 187 ("(I)t is less costly to police simple systems
than it is to police more complicated ones. Causality (responsibility) is difficult to trace
(attribute) in complex systems. If few 'excuses' can be offered, fewer veracity checks have to be
made."); see also BoRK, supra note 20, at 291 ("A vertical restraint, however, will be policed for
the manufacturer in large measure by other outlets, which will quickly feel and report any price
cutting or crossing of territorial lines."); Goldberg, supra note 97, at 110 (noting that manufacturers can encourage dealers to report violations of vertical agreements).
See supra note 227. In other words, as the probability of cheating detection rises, the
228.
potential penalty necessary to deter such cheating falls.
229.
Automobile purchasers in one region, for instance, may hold on to their cars for several years, whereas those in another region may buy or lease a new car every couple of years.
Obviously, customers in the former region will find after-purchase maintenance and repair a
more important component of service than those in the latter region. Cf. Arquit, supra note 69,
at 453 (arguing that resale price maintenance can assure optimal service in after-markets).
230.
Absent standardization, for instance, contracts would no longer be enforceable absent
subjective assent to the individual terms in question. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS§ 211 (1982). It is, of course, much easier for firms to obtain subjective assent to
the extent of an exclusive territory than to the various types and levels of service required and to
the compensation to be provided for those services.
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supply an appropriate level of marketing effort.
In a world of perfect
competition, with no' information costs, such a strategy would make perfect
sense: manufacturers would simply discern the intent of each prospective
232
dealer before allowing the dealer to distribute its products.
In the real
233
world, however, such screening would be difficult and costly.
Even if
manufacturers could accurately determine the intent of distributors to
provide the appropriate level of presale and postsale services, they would
have no guarantee that such intent would not change. After all, the more
effective a distribution system is at ensuring dealer-provided service, the
234
more tempting it will be to free ride.
Dealers may "sign up" fully intending to comply with service obligations, only to change their minds once
they realize just how remunerative free riding can be. Contract law does
235
not provide a cost-free mechanism for deterring such behavior.
As a
result, relegating a manufacturer to the alternative of guessing which franchisees will ignore the incentives they face in order to free ride will be less
effective than, for instance, an exclusive territory or resale price maintenance scheme.
Because less restrictive alternatives are less effective and more costly
to implement, a manufacturer's failure to adopt them in no way suggests
that coercion has been employed to obtain agreement to an exclusive territory or resale price maintenance scheme. Instead, adoption of the more
restrictive provision is equally consistent with an attempt to minimize the
costs of overcoming the market failure that attends reliance on market
236
Despite the existence of less restrictive
transactions to distribute goods.
alternatives, then, the Populist assumption that vertical restrictions are
imposed through an exercise of market power, while consistent with price
231.
See Flynn, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 50, at 292 ("Sellers simply can restrict the
distribution of their products to buyers whom they are certain will provide point of sale serv·
ices."); see also Lawrence Sullivan, Brief of the Small Business Legal Defense Committee as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 26 & n.73, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp.,
465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914) ("Usually, a supplier can obtain the point-of-sale activity it
wants by judicious choice of the retailers to which it sells.").
232.
See supra note 53 (stating that the perfect competition model assumes perfect infonmi:ion).
233.
See Henry N. Butler, Restricted Distribution Contracts and the Opportunistic Pursuit of
Treble Damages, 59 WASH. L. REV. 27, 53 (1983) ("Information about the reliability of distributors is a scarce commodity and, thus, is costly to obtain.").
234.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1984);
Meese, supra note 98, at 13 6 n.ll9.
235.
See supra notes 220-224 and accompanying text.
236.
See Goldberg, supra note 97, at Ill ("[T)he franchisor who adopts more restrictive
terms probably does so because he believes those terms are more efficacious."); Meese, supra note
98, at 151.
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theory, is inconsistent with actual market realities and thus ought not
237
inform the substantive law governing vertical restraints.
This is not to say that all vertical restraints are examples of purely voluntary integration. The NlE is merely exemplifying theory-that is, it
describes what can explain certain restraints, not what necessarily explains
238
them in all cases.
As Chicagoans are quick to point out, the mere fact
that a contract could be anticompetitive does not justify a per se rule
239
against all such contracts.
Similarly, the mere fact that a contract might
be an example of purely voluntary integration does not mean that all such
contracts are noncoercive. Still, absent some showing by Populists that
most such agreements are coerced, there is no basis for the sort of hostility
toward these restraints that Populists currently entertain. As a result, the
Populist attempt to support the traditional per se rules against resale price
maintenance and exclusive territories must fail, and the recent trend in the
courts toward the sort of Rule of Reason treatment for these contracts
240
advocated by some Chicagoans should continue.
D.

Can the Populist Approach Be Salvaged?

As shown above, Populists would adopt an antitrust policy that condemns "coercion," which they define as an exercise of market power, thus
attributing normative significance to a phenomenon associated with price
theory. Even if this purely normative premise is an accurate reflection of
congressional intent, the current Populist hostility to vertical restraints
cannot, without more, be justified. Instead, this hostility is premised upon
an additional, descriptive assumption common to judges, lawyers, and aca237.
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992)
(Antitrust presumptions should rest on actual market realities.); cf. Flynn, Vertical Restraints,
supra note SO, at 1099 ("[L]egal analysis should explore the moral and factual assumptions hidden
in premises.").
See Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Non-Cooperative View, 20 RAND J.
238.
ECON. 113, 117-18 (1989) (defining exemplifying theory).
239.
See Easterbrook, supra note 234, at 15 ("[T]he world of economic theory is full of
'existence theorems'-proof[s] that under certain conditions ordinarily beneficial practices could
have undesirable consequences. But we cannot live by existence theorems."); Posner,supra note
29;at 928-29 (criticizing the Harvard School of antitrust for "verification by plausibility").
240.
See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,
432 n.lS (1990) (holding that per se rules are appropriate only when prohibited conduct is
always anticompetitive or otherwise without redeeming virtue); Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (declaring only contracts that "always or almost always
tend to restrict competition and decrease output" to be per se unlawful); see also supra notes 2026 and accompanying text (describing support by some Chicagoans for Rule of Reason treatment
of vertical restraints and the trend in Supreme Court decisions in that direction).
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demics-namely, that vertical restraints flow from an exercise of market
power and are thus coercive. Populists, then, have rendered their ultimate
prescriptions vulnerable to advances in economic theory that call into
question their purely descriptive price-theoretic account of the formation
of vertical restraints.
The NIE is just such an advance. Price theory suggests that vertical
restraints, whether beneficial or not, are imposed through an exercise of
market power. Yet, as Populists have argued, the real world departs in
many significant respects from that portrayed by price-theoretic models.
The departures-product differentiation, bargaining costs, and information
costs-suggest that partial integration in the form of vertical restraints may
be attempts to attenuate the market failure that would result from leaving
dealers to decide where, how, and at what price to distribute the seller's
product. In light of this insight, the existence of a vertical restraint is as
consistent with purely voluntary integration that attenuates market failure
as it is with any attempt to "coerce" agreement to the restraint, even when
a manufacturer possesses market power. Therefore, the Chicago approach
to vertical restraints does not depend upon an allocative efficiency standard for judging trade restraints. Instead, even if one adopts Populist normative premises, such restraints must be deemed lawful, unless a plaintiff
can establish, pursuant to the approach mandated by the Rule of Reason,
241
that the restraint has been coerced.
Thus, while the Populist approach may well be consistent with neoclassical price theory, it cannot survive in a post-neoclassical world
242
informed by the insights of the NIE. If the Populist position is to survive
in its current form, some new argument in its favor must be forthcoming.
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to engage in a reconfiguration
241. See supra note 23 (citing cases describing the Rule of Reason framework for evaluating
vertical restraints).
242. Cf. Baxter, supra note 134, at 670 ("An adaptive approach to antitrust law is necessary
both because of the diversity and rapidly changing nature of the business conduct to be scrutinized, and because of the continuing progress of economic theory in explaining why firms pursue
certain strategies and the competitive consequences of their behavior."); Bork, supra note 36, at
48; Lessig, supra note 179, at 454-61 (arguing that changes in the perception of economic facts ·
supported changed constitutional readings during the Great Depression); Lessig, supra note 130,
at 1247-51 (suggesting that changing economic theory can justify a changed reading of the antitrust laws). This, of course, has always been the approach of courts determining whether contracts are "in restraint of trade." See, e.g., Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 525
( 1880) ("It is not that contracts in restraint of trade are any more legal or enforceable now than
they were at any former period, but that the courts look differently at the question as to what is a
restraint of trade."); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473 (1887) (opining that general
restraints of trade were no longer per se unreasonable in light of changing economic conditions).
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of the Populist approach, it may be useful to suggest and evaluate some
lines along which such reconstruction might proceed.
First, Populists could attempt to make an empirical showing that sup,
ports the descriptive premise that underlies their hostility toward such
restraints. Populists could concede, as they must, that vertical restraints
could be a result of voluntary integration, but then proceed to show that
most such agreements are, in fact, the result of coercion. Such a showing
would justify some sort of presumption that these restraints are coercive.
When combined with Populist normative premises, the presumption would
require a belief that all such arrangements are unlawful. This sort of presumption, of course, need not be conclusive; perhaps a defendant could
rebut it by proof, for instance, that it lacked any significant market power,
or that there was no conceivable motive for use of coercion to impose the
243
restraint. This sort of reconstruction, while requiring no change in nor,
mative premises, would require significant empirical research that Populists
244
have yet to conduct.
Second, Populists could seek to decouple their normative premises
from price theory by redefining "coercion" so as to encompass methods of
contract negotiation other than simply the exercise of market power.
While no Populist has fully articulated such an alternate definition of
coercion, there are some suggestions in Populist writings about the axes
along which such redefinition might proceed. One Populist, for instance,
243.
Even some Populists, after all, concede that some vertical restraints should he deemed
lawful. See, e.g., Peritz, supra note 25, at 572-73 (suggesting that restraints obtained by a "failing
firm" can be legal).
244. While Populist writings contain many assertions to the effect that most vertical
arrangements are coerced or simply methods of inducing undue product differentiation, none of
these assertions is supported by empirical evidence. See, e.g., Lawrence Sullivan, Brief of the
Small Business Legal Defense Committee as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 13,
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914) (asserting, without
empirical support, that vertical restraints should be presumed to be coerced through an exercise
of market power or simply vehicles for the promotion of unnecessary product differentiation);
Flynn, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 50, at 293 (same). On the other hand, at least some
empirical evidence suggests that a significant proportion of such restraints are, in fact, procompetitive and thus, presumably the result of voluntary integration. See Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale
Price Maintenance: Empirical Evicknce from Litigation, 34 J.L. & ECON. 263, 283-84 (1991)
(finding that "the special services theory" has the potential to explain the vertical restraints at
issue in 65-68% of a sample of litigated cases); see also THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, )R., RESALE
PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 160-63 (1983 ). While
such evidence may not support a rule of per se legality of the sort sought by some members of the
Chicago School, see supra note 20, it certainly militates against the presumption that such
agreements are the result of coercion and supports the position of other Chicagoans that such
contracts should be analyzed under the Rule of Reason. See Baxter, supra note 20, at 948-49
(advocating a Rule of Reason approach to vertical restraints); Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements,
supra note 20, passim (same).
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seems to equate the mere existence of wealth with coercion.
Another
has intimated that the possession of market power might be enough, even if
246
it is not exercised.
Finally, some seem to suggest that the presence of
such restrictions in "take it or leave it" form contracts itself should be
deemed "coercion," an approach consistent with some approaches to
247
unequal bargaining power in the unconscionability context.
Under this
approach, a vertical restraint would be deemed coercive unless the
manufacturer had actually offered each buyer a choice as to whether or not
to sign such a contract.
Each of these approaches, however, proves too much, and adoption of
any of them would require the antitrust laws to treat with hostility conduct
that has previously been viewed as unexceptional. The first approach
would call into question as coercive any restraint obtained by a large firm,
without regard to its anticompetitive effects or redeeming virtues. Such a
result, of course, would penalize bigness qua bigness, an approach rejected
248
by many even at the height of the Populist era.
The second approach
would invalidate any restraint obtained by a firm with market power,
regardless whether that power has actually been exercised, thereby calling
into question any restraint on "trader freedom" obtained by a firm selling a
differentiated product, including the less restrictive alternatives Populists
249
are so quick to trumpet. The third approach would call into question any
restraint, no matter how benign, obtained through a form contract, regardless whether the manufacturer possessed market power. Further, by ensur245.
See Peritz, supra note 136, at 308-10.
246.
See Eleanor M. Fox, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.-Information Failure as Soul or Hook?, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 759, 760 (1994) (arguing that the true theory of
Eastman Kodak is that there is a "right of well-performing firms, valued by customers, not to be
cut out of markets by a firm with power").
247. See, e.g., Bums, supra note 22, at 640 n.196; Gould & Yamey, supra note 144, at 72627; see also Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 145-46 (Ind. 1971) (finding unequal
bargaining power because, inter alia, the contract was offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358 (1960) (same).
248. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand,
J.) ("The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when
he wins."); ARNOLD, supra note 143.
Most of the books in the past on the antitrust laws have been written with the idea that
they are designed to eliminate the evil of bigness. What ought to be emphasized is not
the evils of size but the evils of industries which are not efficient or do not pass efficiency on to consumers. If the antitrust laws are simply an expression of a religion
which condemns largeness as economic sin they will be regarded as an anachronism in a
machine age.
ld. at 3-4.
249. Cf. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 439 (holding that the mere possession of monopoly
power, without more, is not an offense).
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ing that sellers could not represent terms as "standard," this definition of
coercion would render form contracts unenforceable, eliminating the bene,
250
fits associated with standardization.
Third, Populists could, borrowing from the legal realists, question the
baseline against which coercion is defined. · Populists could seize upon the
251
truism that a manufacturer's property rights are a creature of state law
and that, by allowing a manufacturer to refuse to sell its goods to a dealer,
the state has in some sense compelled potential dealers to negotiate with
manufacturers in order to obtain the products that they want to distrib,
252
ute.
Thus, Populists could argue that all restraints are "coercive" in a
253
very basic sense: they can only be obtained as a result of state power.
250. See supra note 230; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1982) (Absent
subjective assent, form contracts are enforceable only if the terms to be enforced are standard.);
see also id. at cmt. a (describing the benefits of standard form contracts); id. at cmt. b ("One of
the purposes of standardization is to eliminate bargaining over details of individual transactions,
and that purpose would not be served if a substantial number of customers [regularly) retained
counsel and reviewed the standard terms.").
251. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 48-54 (1993).
252. Such compulsion, of course, consists of the enforcement of trespass law against dealers
who would avail themselves of a manufacturer's products. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Bargaining,
Duress, and Economic Uberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943).
The owner of the shoes or the food or any other product can insist on other people
keeping their hands off his products. Should he so insist, the government will back him
up with force. The owner of the money can likewise insist on other people keeping
their hands off his money, and the government will likewise back him up with force. By
threatening to maintain the legal barrier against the use of his shoes, their owner may be
able to obtain a certain amount of money as the price of not carrying out his threat....
This does not mean, of course, that in each purchase of a commodity, there is
unfriendliness, or deliberation and haggling over terms. Market conditions may have
standardized prices, so that each party knows that any haggling would be futile. Never·
theless, the transaction is based on the bargaining power of the two parties.
Id. at 604; see also Note, The Peppercorn Theory of Consideration and the Doctrine of Fair Exchange
in Contract Law, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1091-92 (1935) ("Bargaining power exists only
because of government protection of the property rights bargained, and is properly subject to
government control.").
253. Indeed, at least one Populist apparently has an argument like this one in mind:
Both property and contract rights are, of course, creations of society and its legal
system as part of the process by which the values of individualism and community are
implemented in light of the realities confronting that society and its underlying moral
ideals .... Property is not a concept describing rights in things, but is a functional con·
cept recognized by a legal system and describing the relationship between individuals
with respect to interests where the legal system will enforce a right to exclude others.
Similarly, the concept of"contract" is a functional one recognizing a relational interest
founded on consent where the authority of the community will be brought to bear to
enforce a consensual agreement and defining the circumstances [where) this is the
case ....
Antitrust policy should be viewed as it originally was in the Addyston Pipe & Steel
case, as part of the fundamental laws defining the scope of property and contract rights,
rather than as a bothersome limitation upon the unfettered right to invoke the com·
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Absent such power, such restraints would never arise. Thus, Populists
could conclude that antitrust law should seek to replicate the result that
254
would obtain absent such coercion.
This approach, too, has its problems. It is certainly true, for instance,
that the existence of trespass law is a sine qua non of any attempt by a
manufacturer to negotiate a vertical restraint with its dealers. Absent such
law, dealers could simply demand that the seller provide them with prod255
ucts, such as televisions or automobiles, for resale-presumably for free.
This does not mean, however, that a legal regime assigning to the seller the
right to exclude others from its products is necessary to the existence of a
vertical restraint. lf a restraint really does eliminate market failure, dealers
would presumably negotiate among themselves for such a restraint anyway,
. from the manufacturer. 256 H'
'd
even absent any .
mterventton
avmg rece1ve
television sets or automobiles for free, dealers would, as a group, devise
whatever methods were necessary to induce the appropriate level of invest257
ment in service, advertising, and the like.
Trespass law, or any other
exercise of state power on behalf of the manufacturer, is not logically
necessary to the negotiation of a vertical restraint that impairs a dealer's
freedom to sell where or at whatever price the dealer chooses.
munity's law to exercise [those] rights. If this approach were followed, the long term
public interest, wealth distribution and bargaining power could not be ignored in the
determination of what contract and property rights ought to be, because each would
have a significant impact in understanding what can take place under the circumstances
in accord with the assumptions and values underlying property and contract law.
Moreover, preexisting legal choices protecting property or contract rights influence current legal choices and future ones.
Flynn, supra note 46, at 729-30 & n.22; see also PERITZ, supra note 44, at 261-62 & nn.65-66;
Flynn, Vertical Restraints, supra note 50, at 1134-36; Flynn, supra note 46, at 735 (arguing that
the enforcement of property and contract rigbts by state law confers "bargaining power"); Edward
Gluck, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 214 (1922)
("[A seller] is paid for releasing a pressure exerted by the government-the law. The law has
delegated to him a discretionary power over the rights and duties of others.").
254. See Flynn, supra note 46, at 730-31 n.22.
255. Similarly, some form of trademark law is necessary to the negotiation of a franchise
contract; for, absent such law, anyone could distribute a product under the franchisor's mark with
the result that no franchise contract would be necessary. See Meese, supra note 98, at 129-3 7.
256. Cf. id. at 130-31 (stating that absent transaction costs, franchisees would bargain
among themselves for contractual provisions that assured an optimal investment in quality control and collectively enforced such provisions).
257. Cf. WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 27 (observing that nonstandard contracts can
redescribe initial allocations of property rights); Bork, supra note 32, at 956; Goldberg, supra note
97, at 122.
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In the real world, bargaining among dealers may, in some cases, be
258
prohibitively expensive.
Thus, while not logically necessary to the negotiation of a vertical restraint, the allocation to a manufacturer of a property
right to its products may be practically necessary to the creation of an
arrangement that induces the appropriate amount of dealer marketing
259
effort.
On the other hand, it is certainly possible to conceive of situations involving positive bargaining costs in which dealers, beginning with
the right to disrribute products any way they wished, might appoint an
agent to create and monitor vertical restraints that facilitated nonprice
260
competition.
Where dealers would, even in the real world negotiate for
such contracts, enforcement of such a contract can hardly be deemed
coercive simply because property law happens to allocate to the manufacturer the right to the fruits of its labor.
Even if there are cases in which, because of bargaining costs, the allocation of property rights to the manufacturer is necessary to the creation of
a vertical restraint, it is not clear why this fact, on its own, should establish
that a restraint is coercive in a sense that is relevant for purposes of the
antitrust laws. There is simply no reason that the presence vel non of coercion should tum on whether bargaining costs in the real world happen to
be high enough that the coerced restraint could only be negotiated if the
law allocated to the manufacturer the right to sell its product. Putting to
one side the problem of administering such an approach, the results would
be purely arbitrary.
Moreover, such an approach to defining coercion would be overinclusive. All contractual arrangements-including, for instance, the sort of less
restrictive alternatives embraced by Populists-are the result of "coercion,"
258. Cf. Meese, supra note 98, at 131 (noting that "in reality, significant transaction costs"
might prevent franchisees from negotiating a tying agreement among themselves).
259. Cf. id. at 132-34.
260. Cf. WILLIAMSON, supra note 97, at 181-82 (describing franchising in the world of
positive transaction costs as a system whereby franchisees appoint an agent, the franchisor, to
create and enforce quality standards.); Paul H. Rubin, The Thecrry of the Finn and the Structure of
the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & ECON. 223 ( 1978).
[W)e must consider what the franchisee is buying when he buys a franchise. The main
item purchased is the trademark of the franchise. This is valuable because consumers
have a good deal of information about price and quality sold by establishments with a
given trademark. Consumers have this information precisely because the franchisor
polices franchises and makes certain that quality standards are maintained ..
ld. at 227-28.
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if coercion is defined to include the mere enforcement of property rights.
Such a definition of coercion, then, would require some method of
distinguishing desirable from undesirable results of coercion. That is,
Populists would have to explain why the substance of the agreements they
would condemn, as opposed to the process through which they were nego,
tiated, is distinguishable from that of other, beneficial contracts. Yet, as
previously shown, Populists have been unable to offer a workable sub,
stantive distinction between vertical restraints, on the one hand, and other
262
contracts that infringe on the "freedom" of resellers.
The "recognition"
that "all property is theft," then, either requires the invalidation of all
263
contracts or adds nothing to the analysis.
ln sum, Populists have made no attempt to support empirically their
assertion that all or most vertical restraints are imposed through an exer,
cise of market power. Populists could, absent such evidence, achieve the
results they seek by redefining coercion without reference to price theory.
However, each of the new definitions suggested would create problems of
its own and would require a substantial departure from the structure of
existing law, a departure that Populists have not attempted to justify.
Abjuration of price theory as a source of normative content for antitrust
law is apparently far more difficult than Populists initially suspected.
CONCLUSION

Economic theory has long served Populist purposes, despite claims to
the contrary. Where vertical restraints are concerned, such theory has
been useful to Populists at two levels: one negative and one affirmative.
First, price theory's perfect competition model has provided Populists with
a useful straw man. Encouraged by Chicagoans' clumsy references to price
theory, Populists have, with little opposition, overwhelmed a Chicago
position purportedly premised upon an economic model with little con,
nection to the real world. In so doing, Populists have seized the high
ground in this area, laying claim to an analysis that purports to be premised
261. A seller cannot, for instance, obtain agreement to a best efforts clause without the aid
of trespass law. Cf. supra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing how a best efforts clause
could, theoretically, eliminate market failure).
262. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
263. Of course, it is true that the enforcement of trespass law alters the distribution of the
fruits realized from any exchange. See PERITZ, supra note 44, at 262; Madeline Morris, The Strnc,
ture of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 850-51 (1993). Yet, it is unclear how a rule
against exclusive territories or other vertical restraints can alter the distribution of income. Presumably, manufacturers would simply negotiate for less restrictive alternatives or integrate into
distribution themselves. Neither course necessarily leads to a more equitable distributionofincome.
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upon the world as it exists, and not that portrayed by an antiseptic economic model. Second, price theory has provided Populists with a definition of "coercion" that gives content to the congressional command to
protect a "fair" competitive process. By combining the resulting normative
premise with an undisclosed descriptive assumption that vertical restraints
are "imposed" through an exercise of market power, Populists have been
able to portray hostility toward such restraints as a straightforward implementation of the intent of Congress. Despite this heavy reliance upon
price theory, however, Populists have managed to characterize their own
approach as essentially normative, unconnected to the shifting sands of
economic theory.
This Article has exposed the fallacy of the Populist approach at each
level. Despite references by Chicagoans to "price theory," Chicago's
approach to vertical restraints has never rested upon a perfect competition
model or, for that matter, price theory. Instead, the Chicago approach to
vertical restraints is an application of the NIE, which explicitly embraces
and relies upon several departures from the world that is portrayed by the
perfect competition model. As a result, "proof' that the real world departs
from that described by a perfect competition model in no way undermines
Chicago's prescriptions regarding these restraints.
Moreover, Chicago's rejection of traditional doctrines governing vertical restraints embraced by the Populists does not depend upon the adoption of an allocative efficiency approach to antitrust. Even if one adheres
to the Populist normative framework, one must still reject their ultimate
prescriptions, for, contrary to Populist assertions, their normative premises
Instead, Populists define
are not divorced from economic theory.
"coercion"-which they condemn-as an exercise of market power, a concept peculiar to price theory. Moreover, their conclusion that certain
restraints should be presumed "unfair" depends upon a purely descriptive
premise about the economic origin of these restraints. Economic theory
has undermined the premise that such restraints are presumptively the
result of an exercise of market power. NIE, an alternative to price theory
that relies upon many departures from perfect competition, demonstrates
that vertical restraints can be examples of purely voluntary integration,
thus undermining a critical descriptive premise supporting the Populist
hostility toward such agreements. Any per se rule against· vertical
restraints, then, has not been justified, thus suggesting that Rule of Reason
treatment is appropriate.
It is the Populists, then, and not Chicagoans, who have embraced
price theory as the basis for their approach to vertical restraints. By
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grounding their prescriptions on one particular brand of economics, Populists have rendered their position vulnerable to advances in economic theory. Any truly "normative" or "legal" approach to these contracts must
await some new definition of coercion unrelated to any particular economic model. As the Populist experience shows, however, any such
attempt to implement the policies of the Sherman Act without reference
to economic theory will prove exceedingly difficult. What looks "legal"
today may well appear "economic" tomorrow.

